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Abstract
The German two-vote election system implements two historical conceptions of political repre-
sentation coined at the end of the 18th century during the American and French Revolutions.
The descriptive conception | the parliament portrays the society in miniature | is imple-
mented in the rst vote with which local candidates are delegated to the federal parliament.
The agent conception | the parliament consists of people's trustees who are not necessarily
their countrymen | is implemented in the second vote for a party. The recent conception of
representation, policy representation | how well the party system and government represent
policy preferences of the electorate, is supported by no election instrument, and the Third Vote
election method just aims at lling in this gap.
Under the `Third Vote', the voters cast no votes but are asked about their preferences on
policy issues as declared in the party manifestos (like in VAAs | voting advice applications, e.g.
German Wahl-O-Mat: Abolish Euro?|Yes/No; Leave NATO?|Yes/No, etc.). Then the policy
prole of the electorate with the balance of public opinion on every issue is determined. The
degree to which the parties match with it is expressed by the parties' representativeness indices
of popularity (the average percentage of electors represented on all the issues) and universality
(the percentage of cases when a majority is represented), and the parliament seats are distributed
among the parties in proportion to their indices. The voters are no longer swayed by politicians'
charisma and communication skills but are directed to subject matters behind personal images
and ideological symbols. The focus on choice properties (political and economic implications
of elections, or of single decisions like Bexit or involvement in a new war) is supposed to make
vote less emotional and supercial but more rational and responsible, aiming nally at a `more
democratic' representative democracy.
The Third Vote has been approbated and improved during the 2016, 2017 and 2018 elections
to the Student Parliament (StuPa) of the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT). In the 2016
experiment, the policy questions for the electoral ballots have been taken from the StuPa-O-
Mat | the KIT adaptation of the Wahl-O-Mat to the StuPa elections. However, the questions
proposed by the election committee can be favorable for one party and unfavorable for another,
making elections manipulable. To avoid impartiality in the 2017 experiment, the competing
parties have formulated the questions themselves on their own responsibility | as an element
of the electoral campaign, then all the parties have answered all the questions, and nally an
optimization model has selected 25 ones to maximally contrast between the party positions. A
more sophisticated optimization model in the 2018 experiment has shown even better results.
This paper has three subjects. The rst one is the Third Vote's equalization eect: an
unusually small ratio of the resulting parliament faction sizes, which is surmounted by the
Third Vote Plus | a minor modication of the Third Vote. The second subject is combining
the Third Vote and Third Vote Plus methods with traditional elections. The third subject is
comparative evaluation of three optimization models to select questions. Due to these advances,
the Third Vote can be considered an election-ready prototype of a voting method either for use
alone or for integration into existing election systems.
Keywords: Policy representation, representative democracy, direct democracy, elections,
coalitions, theory of voting.
JEL Classication: D71
iii
iv
Acknowledgements
The data for this study are taken from the 2018 Third Vote experiment which was made possible
by the organizational and creative skills of the author's seminar students at the Karlsruhe
Institute of Technology grouped into:
(a) Public relations team (responsible, among other things, for negotiations with the AStA
| the student body council | on the conditions of the experiment), managed by Marius
Amrhein and Johannes Rauh: Nicolas Becker, Felicitas Bohland, Sebastian Brugger, Oliver
Brutzel, Simon Hort, Hendrik Simon Meyer and Finn Bastian Silber;
(b) Internat team (responsible, among other things, for updating and maintaining the Third
Vote web page and the experiment advertising) managed by Sebastian Schafer: Benjamin
Casper, Maria Kolot, Elias Muller, Chang Qin, Tobias Seifried, Dennis Sommer and Anna
Tworek;
(c) Parties team (responsible, among other things, for negotiations with student parties and
eliciting questions and answers) managed by Paula Johanna Breitling and Anna Theresa
Schneider: Benedikt Otto Wilhelm Appel, Ibrahim Atanur Dikici, Patrick Dorsch, Simon
Gretter, Maximilian Hanf, Moritz Kimmich, Julian Kinzel, Dennis Klein, Niklas Schaupp,
Julian Skupin, Nadia Sliti, Tim Axel Stihler, Leonie Wallat, Lukas Walter and Maximilian
Wiedemer;
(d) Ballot team (responsible, among other things, for optical input of experimental ballots by
adapting the techniques for the students' evaluation of the KIT lecturers) managed by
Mercal Abdin: Nils Fink, Abdullah Nasser Al-Khudhiri, Stefanie Fischer, Thore Kayser,
Mikael Lansitalo, Jonathan Paule, Dominik Schlaich, Eren Solmaz and Elyes Saad
(e) Election team (responsible, among other things, for the realization of the experiment
during the ocial election) managed by Sascha Pfau: Patrick Brkovic, Magdalena Buttner,
Ahmed Daoussi, Simin He, Adrian Krieg, Susanne Plaumann, Sandra Schier and Paulina
Schmid;
Special thanks are also due to the members of the KIT student election committee: Lorenz
Fischer, Manuel Schonheinz, David Kuhmann and Patricia Mayer. The administrative support
and intermediation by Mrs Magdalena Gereck, coordinator of the KIT department of Strategic
Development and Communication, and Tobias Dittrich, research fellow to the chair, is also
gratefully acknowledged.
The author cordially thanks all the persons mentioned and those who took part in the
experimental election for their engagement and active participation in the project.
v
vi
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 The 2018 Ocial and Experimental Elections to the KIT Student Parliament 5
3 Policy Representation by the Student Parties and the Student Parliament 9
4 Evaluation of Coalitions 21
5 StuPa's Political Spectrum 26
6 Optimal Selection of Questions 30
7 Evaluation of Optimal Selections of Questions 33
8 Conclusions 40
9 Appendix: Detailed Tables 10 and 11 41
vii
viii
1 Introduction
The Third Vote After the introduction of the Third Vote election method in [Tangian 2014,
Tangian 2017b], it has been approbated in three experimental elections to the Student Par-
liament (StuPa) of the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT). The public response to the
experiments helped to improve the methodology and to resolve implementation problems. The
most stimulating feedback was from the World Forum for Democracy, Council of Europe,
Strasbourg, 2016, where a video documentary on the rst experiment has been demonstrated
[World Forum for Democracy 2016]; see also the experiments' web-page [Third Vote 2019].
Under the Third Vote, the individuals cast no votes but are asked about their preferences on
policy issues as declared in the party manifestos (like in VAAs | voting advice applications, e.g.
GermanWahl-O-Mat:1 Abolish Euro?|Yes/No; Leave NATO?|Yes/No, etc.). Then the policy
prole of the electorate with the balance of public opinion on every issue is dened. The degree
to which the parties match with it is expressed by the parties' indices of popularity (the average
percentage of electors represented) and universality (the percentage of issues when a majority is
represented), and the parliament seats are distributed among the parties in proportion to their
indices.
Historical Roots and Current Context What is the need in such an election method? The
contemporary representative democracy has been conceptualized at the late 18th century during
the American and French Revolutions. The founding debates focused primarily on two questions:
Who should be represented?, i.e. who is entitled to vote (males or also females, with which civil
and property status, etc.) and Who can be a representative? (sons of the constituency or all
trusted citizens, taxpayers of a certain level, etc.). The question What should be represented?,
i.e. which policies must be pursued on behalf of the electorate and how well the political system
should represent the electorate's policy preferences, was of secondary importance. Indeed, at
that time the electorate was concerned with very few political things like taxation or security,
topics like foreign aairs or university regulations were for most people of little interest, and
many currently debatable matters like social security or environmental protection did not yet
exist. Since population's activities were mainly local and the government operated at a higher
level, politicians made decisions with a limited accountability to the electorate.
Now globalization expands beyond national boarders and, on the other hand, profoundly
aects individual households. The society becomes signicantly more advanced and more politi-
cized. The electorate is better educated, comprehensive information is easily available, and
political engagement is fueled by numerous medias and social networks. In elections, however,
the questionWho? still outbalances the questionWhat?, and voting for candidates or parties by
name bears some of the responsibility for that. People often pay more attention to the personal
image of politicians than to party manifestos or even ideological platforms and, casting votes
that are actually in opposition to their own policy preferences, elect those who do not represent
their interests.2 Being re-elected, the government continues to pursue unpopular polices, people
are dissatised and protest, often massively and sometimes violently, against the government
elected by themselves | not a theoretical but practical democratic paradox often referred to as
`democratic decit' [European Union 2017, United Nations 2016].
Three Conceptions of Representation | Three Votes It is not surprising that the ques-
tionWhat? is not articulated in classical conceptions of political representation; see [Pitkin 1967,
1Wahl-O-Mat | an invented word constructed of Wahl|election and Automat, something like `Elec-
tomat'; for description and explanations see [Bundeszentrale fur politische Bildung 2019].
2This phenomenon of irrational voting behavior and this type of election failure are analyzed in
[Tangian 2013, Tangian 2017a, Tangian 2017e] using as examples the 2013 and 2017 German federal
elections, respectively.
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Manin 1997]. The major two conceptions are implemented in the German two-vote system. The
descriptive conception | the parliament portrays the society in miniature3 | is implemented
in the rst vote with which local candidates are elected and delegated to the federal parliament.
These direct mandate holders from 299 German constituencies ll 299 Bundestag seats.
The agent conception | the parliament is a committee of political experts who are people's
trustees and don't have to be their countrymen4 | is implemented in the second vote for a
party. This vote is used to dene the Bundestag faction ratio. For this purpose, another 299
Bundestag seats are allocated and, if necessary, extra seats (overhang mandates) are added.
In the 1960s, academics started to discuss policy representation | how well the party sys-
tem and government represent policy preferences of the electorate.5 In 1989, this idea had
been unknowingly used in the Dutch voting advice application StemWijzer (= `VoteMatch')
[Pro demos 2019] which model launched in 1998 in internet was taken over by some other coun-
tries [Garzia and Marschall 2014]. This third conception of representation is still not imple-
mented in elections, and the Third Vote method just aims at lling in this gap. Under the
Third Vote, the electors are no longer swayed by politicians' charisma and their communication
skills but are directed to subject matters behind personal images, ideological symbols and gen-
der, cultural or other prejudices. The focus on political and economic implications of choice is
supposed to make vote less emotional and superuous but more rational and responsible.
The Third Vote also contributes to attaining some of the United Nations Sustainable De-
velopment Goals [United Nations 2015] that make a special emphasis on social and technical
challenges of digitalization [OECD 2017, Van der Velden 2018]. Within digitalization, there are
so-called articial life projects of replacing certain human functions by intelligent robots, e.g.
for distant space missions from where signal exchange with the Earth can take hours and which
therefore need comprehensive automatic control. The interactions between agents/units in the
digital society and articial life simulate that among people, and when the system size is large,
the democratic organizational principles become highly relevant. The Third Vote approach can
help in operationalizing the notion of representation and its hierarchical implementation.
Background Political Philosophy The traditional vote and the Third Vote dier in political
philosophy. In traditional elections, each voter aggregates his/her partial judgements and chooses
the favorite candidate. Since the election winner is derived form individual choices, this approach
implements the liberal philosophy of individual determination in the sense of [Locke 1689]. Under
the Third Vote, the electorate is considered a single body with a public prole constituted by
balances of public opinion on each issue. The election winner is determined by the closeness of
his/her prole to this single public prole. Thereby, the Third Vote implements the collectivist
philosophy of public determination in the sense of general will of [Rousseau 1762]. It should be
noted that VAAs (like the Wahl-O-Mat) use the same data structure as the Third Vote but,
advising optimal candidates to vote for, follow the philosophy of individual determination.
3The descriptive conception has been particularly defended in America by John Adams (1735{1826,
2nd President of the US) and in France by Honore Gabriel de Mirabeau (1749{1791, French Revolution
politician).
4The agent conception has been developed in America by Alexander Hamilton (1755{1804, 1st US
Secretary of the Treasury) and James Madison (1751{1836, 4th President of the US) and in France by
Emmanuel Sieyes (1748{1836, clergyman and constitutional theorist).
5Policy representation is particularly discussed by [Miller and Stokes 1963, Monroe 1979,
Bartels 1991, Hartley and Russett 1992, Stimson et al. 1995, Wlezien 1995, Wlezien 1996, Monroe 1998,
Miller et al. 1999, Sharpe 1999, Smith 1999, Powell 2000, Budge et al. 2001, Soroka 2003, Wlezien 2004,
Klingemann et al. 2006, Budge and McDonald 2007, Cerami 2007, Soroka and Wlezien 2010,
Volkens et al. 2013]. To monitor policy representation in modern democracies, a special database
is created within the prize-winning Manifesto project (Berlin), aimed at `quantitative content analysis
of parties' election programs from more than 50 countries covering all free, democratic elections since
1945' [WZB 2019].
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The traditional vote and the Third Vote can lead to dierent outcomes. Let us imagine that
Brexit is characterized by its three major consequences: Immigration restriction, Closing the
Irish border and Economic recession/Pound devaluation, and that three equally large groups of
British have the proles of their attitudes toward these consequences shown in the table below.
The rst group prefers to keep the current situation, the second and third groups will restrict
immigration but dier in what they are ready to pay for it.
Brexit implications Attitude proles Majority Public
1 2 3 choice prole
Immigration restriction   + + ! +
Closing the Irish border   +   !  
Economic recession/Pound devaluation     + !  
# # #
Votes for Brexit   + + ! + #
Public opinion on Brexit  
Traditional vote operates in the order ### ! : each individual aggregates his/her opinion
prole which consists of partial judgements and makes his/her nal choice. Then two of three
groups vote for Brexit (+), and Brexit is approved (+). Under the Third Vote, the order of
operations is
!!! #. The public prole consists of public attitudes toward each issue: one positive
and two negative. After their aggregation, Brexit is not approved ( ). Thus, we can assume
that the Brexit crisis might be avoided if the Brexit referendum were based on the Third Vote
principles instead of direct Yes/No-vote.
Concerns In [Tangian 2013, Tangian 2017a, Tangian 2017d], the Third Vote is hypotheti-
cally applied to redistribute seats in the 2009, 2013 and 2017 German Bundestags, respectively,
achieving a signicant gain in their representativeness. The electorate's policy prole is con-
structed from over 30 public opinion polls preceding the elections, and the party positions are
taken from the 2009, 2013 and 2017 Wahl-O-Mat's, respectively. Since the public opinion polls
dier in the degree of reliability and relevance to the elections, the conclusions | as they are
based on imperfect data | can be considered only with reservations. To judge more deni-
tively the advantages of the Third Vote, it has been tested during the 2016, 2017 and 2018
StuPa elections. In the 2016 experiment, the policy questions for the electoral ballots have been
taken from the StuPa-O-Mat | the KIT adaptation of the Wahl-O-Mat to the StuPa elections
[Tangian 2016, Tangian 2017c]. As the Wahl-O-Mat, the StuPa-O-Mat is operated by a special
committee whose members select questions assuming that certain criteria are met. However,
questions proposed even by a supposedly neutral committee can be favorable for one party and
unfavorable for another, making elections manipulable.
Another not obvious feature of the Third Vote is a so-called equalization eect: a small
ratio of the parliament faction sizes. The equalization eect is explained as follows. Under
traditional elections, parties are voted on by disjoint groups of their adherents of very dierent
sizes, implying corresponding dierent sizes of party factions in the parliament. Under the Third
Vote, the factions are proportional to the party popularity and universality indices. These indices
take into account the size of groups represented by parties on each issue. Instead of many groups
of party adherents, on every issue there are only `Yes'-group and `No'-group (not to count those
who abstain) which are generally quite numerous. Since the groups of party adherents join
(dierently on each issue), they provide a larger support for weak parties. In other words,
the indices reect the full representativeness of the parties and cannot be therefore considered
inadequate, although the equalization of factions looks unusual.
Finally, some voters identify themselves with certain parties and would prefer to continue to
vote by party name. This requirement rises the question about the combination of the Third
Vote with traditional election methods.
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Improvements and Integration in the Existing Election Systems To avoid impartiality
in preparing questions for the 2017 experiment, the competing parties have formulated the
questions themselves on their own responsibility within the electoral campaign. Then all the
parties have answered the collected 94 questions, and an optimization model has selected 25 ones
to maximally contrast between the party positions [Tangian 2017e]. In 2018 a more sophisticated
optimization model showed even better results [Tangian 2018]. Thereby, the manipulability of
the Third Vote is avoided.
The equalization eect can be tackled by removing `negative representativeness' from con-
sideration. We recall that if a party represents majorities and minorities with equal chances,
e.g. the representation of public opinion is decided by tossing a coin, its expected popularity
and universality are equal to 50%. The values below this threshold mean that the party is
`more non-representative than representative'. Therefore, we can consider only the `positive
representativeness' | the index segments beyond the threshold of 50%. The replacement of the
full indices with their `positive' segments results in greater parliament faction ratios under the
Third Vote, resembling the ones under traditional elections by party name. Such a modication
of the Third Vote is called `Third Vote Plus' or shortly `3rd Vote+'.
Combining the Third Vote with the traditional election by candidate/party name is also
possible. It is attained by merging the indices with which the parliament seats are partitioned.
Under traditional elections, the seats are distributed in proportion to the index `percentage of
votes'. The Third Vote operates with the indices of representativeness in the same way. To
make both indices commensurable, the parties' representativeness indices are normalized, i.e.
proportionally reduced to the total of 100%. Then the (weighted) mean of the percentage of
votes and the normalized representativeness can be used to allocate the parliament seats.
Due to these advances, the Third Vote can be considered election-ready prototype of a voting
method either for use alone or for integration into existing election systems.
Structure of the Working Paper We illustrate these techniques using the data from the
2018 electoral experiment. At rst we explain all the notions for the Third Vote based on 30
questions. After that we simulate Third Vote elections with shorter questionnaires extracted
from the initial one by three optimization models. Having compared the outcomes, we make
recommendations for practical applications.
Section 2, `The 2018 Ocial and Experimental Elections to the KIT Student Parliament',
describes the students' self-organization in the KIT, introduces student parties and summarizes
the outcomes of the 2018 StuPa elections, both ocial and experimental.
In Section 3, `Policy Representation by the Student Parties and the Student Parliament', the
indices of popularity and universality, both of the student parties and the StuPa, are computed
from the experiment data. We consider a modication of the Third Vote, Third Vote Plus, and
explain how the Third Vote methods are combined with traditional elections by party name.
In Section 4, `Evaluation of Coalitions', the representativeness of eligible coalitions in the
StuPa, as if elected using the experimental ballots, is estimated. Although the StuPa does not
practice coalition building, this analysis of general interest reveals the parliament potential.
In Section 5, `StuPa's Political Spectrum', we construct the StuPa party space and contiguous
ordering of the student parties which reects their left{right orientation. Preservation of the
political spectrum is important while reducing the Third Vote questionnaire.
In Section 6, `Optimal Selection of Questions', the problem of reducing the Third Vote ques-
tionnaire is considered and three models for nding optimal subsets of questions are introduced
and applied.
In Section 7, `Evaluation of Optimal Selections of Questions', 12 heuristic and optimal ques-
tionnaires are tested as if for StuPa elections by ve methods. They are compared with regard
to the representativeness of the resulting parliament and its most realistic coalitions and the
preservation of the political spectrum.
4
In Section 8, `Conclusions', the main ndings are recapitulated and put into the context.
Section 9, `Appendix', contains extended versions of two concise tables from the main text.
2 The 2018 Ocial and Experimental Elections to the KIT Stu-
dent Parliament
The 2018 StuPa Election German student parliaments are university representative bodies
established according to the laws of the corresponding German state. In the Karlsruhe Institute
of Technology (KIT), the Student Parliament (StuPa) is constituted under the rules of the state
of Baden-Wurttemberg. Its responsibilities include electing ocers to the executive organ of the
student body, AStA (Allgemeiner Studierendenausschuss = General Committee of Students),
making decisions about the budget of the student body and participating in the university
commissions and councils. During the semester, the StuPa meets bi-weekly and the meetings
are open to the public [AStA 2018, StuPa 2018].
Elections to the StuPa are held every summer, and all the KIT students are eligible to vote.
The 25 StuPa seats are distributed among student parties in proportion to the number of votes
they receive in elections.6 The 2018/19 StuPa consists of 25 members from six student parties,
most of which are nationwide and some having international aliations; see Table 1. Four of
them, Juso, LHG, die Linke.SDS and die LISTE, are closely associated with and supported by
German political parties. The RCDS is close to the CDU/CSU but declares its independence.
Only the FiPS is completely autonomous, being a local student organization of the KIT. The
German student organizations are not strictly aliated with the aforementioned political parties,
as they have discrete historical roots. They prefer to call themselves `a group', `an alliance',
`a list', `an association' or even `a faculty experience', thereby emphasizing relaxed forms of
relations and/or no self-identication as real parties.
Of the 23,118 students eligible to vote, 3,512 took part in the election and cast 3,496 valid
ballots including 144 abstentions; 16 were deemed invalid. Thus, the turnout was 15.2%.
The results are displayed in Table 1, and the complete ocial report is downloadable from
[Endgueltige Wahlergebnisse 2018, p. 14]. For more information about the StuPa and the 2018
StuPa election see the KIT student journal [Ventil 2018].
The 2018 StuPa-O-Mat The AStA webpage has a link to the StuPa-O-Mat, the KIT adap-
tation of the Wahl-O-Mat to the StuPa election. Previously, the StuPa-O-Mat questions have
been formulated by the election committee. Since 2017, the parties are asked to formulate ques-
tions themselves, as well as to answer all of them, including the questions by other parties. In
2018, the parties' questions have been sorted by the election committee; the preselected 37 with
the party answers are displayed in Table 2. (For the parties' comments to their answers in Ger-
man and English see [Tangian 2018, Appendix, pp. 45{119]). Questions 32{37 with unanimous
parties positions are omitted because they do not distinguish between the parties. Question 31,
which poorly discriminates between the parties and, moreover, the party answers duplicate the
answers to Questions 18 and 24, is also omitted. Of the remaining 30, the election committee
has chosen 25 for the StuPa-O-Mat.
In fact, one would rather eliminate Questions 1, 3, 15, 19, 21 and 22 with almost unanimous
party positions (excluding abstentions, the denitive positions are all equal). The remaining 24
`essential' questions are considered later as an alternative to the 25 StuPa-O-Mat questions.
6The integer number of StuPa seats is nally partitioned using the method by [Saint-Ligue 1910], but
we always refer to more accurate percentages of votes received by the parties. To avoid overhang man-
dates, faction members can be assigned not integer-valued but fraction-valued votes | an unconventional
but mathematically natural solution.
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Table 1: Results of the 2018 ocial and experimental elections of the KIT Student Parliament
Party logo Party description Ocial
votes
Experimental votes
All Not
inuenced
by the
StuPa-O-
Mat
Inuenced
by the
StuPa-O-
Mat
Num% Num% Num% Num%
FiPS (Fachschaftserfahrung im Parlament der
Studierenden = Faculty Experience in the Par-
liament of Students). A local student organi-
zation of the KIT, independent of established
political parties; dedicated, close to students
[FiPS 2018].
936 27.9 319 27.3 224 31.2 95 21.2
Juso (Jung Sozialisten = Young Socialists); the
youth wing of the SPD (Social Democratic
Party of Germany. Promotes freedom, equal-
ity and solidarity, open discussion, democracy
in all parts of society, having an impact on all
parts of society; representation in many forums
[Juso 2018].
843 25.1 264 22.6 173 24.1 91 20.3
Die Linke.SDS (Die Linke. Sozialistisch-
Demokratischer Studierendenverband = The
Left. Social Democratic Students' Alliance).
The student organization of DIE LINKE = The
Left. Promotes a more social, ecological, fem-
inist and sustainable university; separation be-
tween economic system and research; supports
students with social projects [Linke.SDS 2018].
596 17.8 237 20.3 113 15.7 124 27.6
LHG (Bundesverband Liberaler Hochschulgrup-
pen = Federal Association of Liberal Student
Groups). Associated with the FDP (Free Demo-
cratic Party). Liberal, ideology-free [LHG 2018].
408 12.2 154 13.2 85 11.8 69 15.4
Die LISTE (Liste fur basisdemokratische Initia-
tive, Studium, Tierzucht und Elitenbeforderung
= List for Grassroots Democratic Initiatives,
Education, Animal Breeding and Promotion of
Elites), the youth organization of Die PARTEI
(Partei fur Arbeit, Rechtstaat, Tierschutz,
Elitenforderung und basisdemokratische Initia-
tive = Party for Labor, Rule of Law, Ani-
mal Protection, Promotion of Elites and Grass-
roots Democratic Initiative), a party with paro-
dical character. Promotes humanization of stud-
ies, solidarity and egalitarianism, particularly
among students of dierent graduation levels
[LISTE 2018].
314 9.4 110 9.4 61 8.5 49 10.9
RCDS (Ring christlich-demokratischer Studen-
ten = Association of Christian Democratic Stu-
dents). Stands politically near the German
conservative union CDU/CSU (Christian Demo-
cratic Union/Christian Social Union in Bavaria).
Promotes pragmatic and factual thinking, rep-
resenting the student body without ideological
inuence; aiming for an ideal development for
learning and teaching; strives for greatest possi-
ble impact for students [RCDS 2018].
255 7.6 84 7.2 63 8.8 21 4.7
Total 3352 1168 719 449
Source for ocial votes: [Endgueltige Wahlergebnisse 2018, p. 14]
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Table 2: The 2018 KIT student party positions on 37 questions preselected by the election
committee: +[1]|Yes,  [1]|No, ?|Neutral or missing
Questions preselected by the election committee
(the StuPa-O-Mat question numbers are in parentheses)
Party positions (B)
F
iP
S
J
u
so
L
in
k
e
L
H
G
L
IS
T
E
R
C
D
S
1(3) Improve intra-campus transportation. Public transportation be-
tween campus south and campus north should be improved.
+ + + ? ? +
2(6) Female quota. The KIT should establish a comprehensive wom-
ens quota for sta members.
? + +      
3(1) Study fees. There should be study fees. ?     ?    
4(24)Vegan meals. The canteen & cafeteria should extend their oers
of vegan and sustainable meals.
? + + ?    
5(19)No study duration limit. The maximum period of study should
be abolished.
  ? +   +  
6(17)Guaranteed master places. There should be a master program
guarantee for KIT intern applicants.
+   + + + +
7(7) Guaranteed childcare places. There should be a guaranteed child-
care place for every KIT-member (students included) on the
campus.
+ + + +   +
8(2) O-peak ticket. There should be a Baden-Wurttemberg-wide
evening and weekend ticket with the semester fee.
  ? ?   +  
9(8) Restrict commercial advertisement. There should be a smaller
amount of commercial promotions on the campus.
+ ? +     +
10 Lecture halls for courses only. The student parliament should
constitute that symposia and conferences do not use lecture hall
capacities.
+ ? ? ?    
11(12) Financing the student body house from student fees. A part of
the student fee (currently 5,99 EUR) should be used for nanc-
ing a house of the student body. These rooms would be used
for institutions of the student parliament (committees, student
groups, etc.)
+ + +   + +
12(13) Student funds for the campus ecology. Student funds should be
used for the ecological shaping of the campus.
  ? +   ?  
13(4) The campus should become a trac-calmed sector. This would
mean to introduce walking speed for the entire vehicle trac
(cars, motorcycles, bikes, etc.).
    +      
14(25) Lower mensa prices. Prices in the Cafeteria and the Mensa
should be cut.
+ ? ? +   +
15 Larger bike parkings. More parking slots for bikes should be
provided in front of the library and the lecture halls.
+ + + ? + +
16(9) Hall for cultural events. The KIT should provide an event hall
(like the garden hall) for student cultural events.
+ ? + ?    
17(14) Expense allowances for the student body. For elected persons of
the constituted student body, it should be possible to receive a
expense allowance.
  ? ?     +
18(15) Emergency scholarships. The constituted student body should
introduce an emergency scholarship for students who reached
short term and not self-inicted pleite situation.
+ + + + +  
Continued next page: : :
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Table 2: (continued) The 2018 KIT student party positions on 37 questions preselected by the
election committee: +[1]|Yes,  [1]|No, ?|Neutral or missing
Questions preselected by the election committee
(the StuPa-O-Mat question numbers are in parentheses)
Party positions (B)
F
iP
S
J
u
so
L
in
k
e
L
H
G
L
IS
T
E
R
C
D
S
19(16)Digitalization of teaching. The AStA should actively promote the
digitalization of teaching. For example: lecture notes, webinars,
online platforms, etc.
+ ? + + + +
20(18) Career aiming courses. The courses at KIT should be designed
for a quick career entry.
? ?   ?   +
21 Performance-dependent expense allowances for AStA. The ex-
pense allowance for AStA-referents should be reduced if a refer-
ent does not fulll his tasks.
+ ? ? + + +
22 Engagement against extremism. The constituted student body
should be more involved against extremism of any kind.
+ + ? + + +
23(11) Lower student fee. The student contribution (currently 5,99
EUR) should be lowered.
    ? + ? +
24(22)Anonymous exams. Exams at the KIT should be written
anonymously.
+ + + + +  
25 Student body representation in the Senate. The student body
should be more strongly represented in the KIT Senate.
+ + +   ? +
26(23)More dormitory rooms. The student parliament should stand up
for more dorm rooms.
+ + + ?   +
27(5) Civil clause. The KIT - campus south included - should have a
civil clause.
  + +      
28(10) Student body political involvement. The student parliament
should further on be allowed to express itself to every political
topic.
+ + + ? +  
29(21) Exams on Saturdays. To improve the lecture hall situation, ex-
ams should more often take place also on Saturdays.
+     +   +
30(20)More examination attempts. The maximum number of examina-
tion attempts at the KIT should be increased.
  + +   +  
31 Uniform library breaks. Uniform regulations for breaks should
be introduced at all the KIT-libraries.
+ + + + +  
32 Rooms for the student body. More premises should be granted
for the student parliament, also for permanent use.
+ + + + + +
33 Removing bike wracks. Bike wrecks should be removed on a reg-
ular basis.
+ + + + + +
34 Open libraries on weekends. Libraries of the faculties should be
kept open also on weekends during the exam period, in order to
loosen the learning place situation.
+ + + + + +
35 Study semester abroad. The constituted student body should be
more committed to students who want to study abroad for a
semester and promote it.
+ + + + + +
36 More learning places on the campus. The number of learning
places on campus should be increased.
+ + + + + +
37 Barrier-free classes. All courses have to be barrier-free. + + + + + +
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The 2018 Experimental Election During the ocial 2018 StuPa election on June 18{22, an
experimental election was organized. Additionally to the ocial ballot, each voter was oered an
experimental ballot with Questions 1{30, either in German or in English (for foreign students)
to be lled in on voluntary basis; see Figures 1 and 2.7 As in 2016 and 2017, the experimental
ballot is entitled `The Third Vote' because it complements the German two-vote system with
an additional vote in the form of embedded referenda. The preamble to the ballot explains
the goal of the experiment | and that it does not impact the ocial election. For analysis
purposes, the ballot's Question 1.1 asks to indicate the party he/she votes for in the ocial
ballot, and Question 2.1 species the degree to which the StuPa-O-Mat inuences the choice.
In the following analysis we reduce the four options to two: either the vote is inuenced by the
StuPa-O-Mat or not inuenced. The following Questions 3.1{3.30 are the ones retained from
the list of 37 questions.
Although many students were discouraged from participation in the experiment by the length
of the experimental ballot's questionnaire, as many as 1,255 students have cast them. Some of
students started to ll in the ballot but stopped after having answered a few questions, some
might have answered questions rather irrationally (which was not possible to control), and a few
equally abstained or equally positively answered to all the 30 questions, which could hardly be
considered seriously. Finally, only 1,168 out of 1,255 experimental ballots were selected as valid
for further processing. For more details on processing the ballots see [Tangian 2018].
3 Policy Representation by the Student Parties and the Student
Parliament
Date Structure for Analysis The party answers to the 30 questions of the experimental
ballot and statistics of positive/negative voters' positions are displayed in Table 3. The table
is visualized by Figure 3. The grey bars depict the balance of opinions in three vote sets
(all experimental votes, the inuenced and the not inuenced by the SzuPa-O-Mat). For each
question and each set of votes, the grey segment to the left of the vertical 0-axis shows the
percentage of antagonists, and the grey segment on the right hand shows the percentage of
protagonists. To better visualize the majority opinion, the total length of the grey bar is
normalized (proportionally extended to 100%) and shown by a box. The majority opinion is
on the side where the box surpasses the 50% limit. For instance, the majority opinion on
Question 1 in all three vote sets is `Yes'. The party positions are shown by the parties' color
bars on the left-hand (`No') or right-hand (`Yes') side of the chart. The length of the party bars
for each vote set is equal to the percentage of votes received by the party within this set. For a
missing (neutral) party answer, its color bar is also missing.
Popularity and Universality of Student Parties Basing on the data collected, we evaluate
the representativeness of student parties'. To be specic, let us construct the FiPS' popularity
and universality indices for the set of all experimental votes. For Question 1, `Improve intra-
campus transportation: : :', the balance of public opinion with 28% of protagonists and 4% of
antagonists (rst line of Table 3) is shown by the upper grey bar in Figure 3. The balance of
public opinion is normalized, that is, the grey bar is extended proportionally to 100%, as shown
by the framing box. Thereby, we assume that abstaining voters' passive Yes/No positions are
distributed in the proportion of the protagonist-to-antagonist ratio. For Question 1, the FiPS
7The formatting and scanning the experimental ballots have been done at the the KIT Strategic
Development and Communication department's facility for processing questionnaires with teaching course
evaluations by students.
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)833/9 6HLWH
(YD6\V ([SHULPHQW7KH7KLUG9RWH
%LWWHVRPDUNLHUHQ %LWWHYHUZHQGHQ6LHHLQHQ.XJHOVFKUHLEHURGHUQLFKW]XVWDUNHQ)LO]VWLIW'LHVHU)UDJHERJHQZLUGPDVFKLQHOOHUIDVVW
.RUUHNWXU %LWWHEHDFKWHQ6LHLP,QWHUHVVHHLQHURSWLPDOHQ'DWHQHUIDVVXQJGLHOLQNVJHJHEHQHQ+LQZHLVHEHLP$XVIOOHQ
'DVÄWKH7KLUG9RWH³([SHULPHQW]LHOWGDUDXIDEHLQH$OWHUQDWLYH]XPMHW]LJHQ%XQGHVWDJVZDKOV\VWHPGDU]XVWHOOHQ'XUFK
GLH(LQIKUXQJHLQHU'ULWWVWLPPHZROOHQZLUGLH,GHHYRQ3URI$QGUDQLN7DQJLDQYHUIROJHQHLQHUHSUlVHQWDWLYHUH
'HPRNUDWLH]XVFKDIIHQ'LHVH]XVlW]OLFKH6WLPPHVROODXVVFKOLHOLFKHXUH0HLQXQJ]XEHVWLPPWHQ7KHPHQJHELHWHQ
UHSUlVHQWLHUHQXPVRPLWHLQHEDVLVGHPRNUDWLVFKH.RPSRQHQWHLQGLH:DKOPLWHLQIOLHHQ]XODVVHQ6RVROOGLHSROLWLVFKH
(LQVWHOOXQJGHU:lKOHUJHPHVVHQZHUGHQ'LHVHZLUGPLWGHU(LQVWHOOXQJGHU3DUWHLHQDEJHJOLFKHQXQGVROOVLFKDXIGDV
:DKOHUJHEQLVDXVZLUNHQ'DGXUFKVROOHLQLUUDWLRQDOHV:DKOYHUKDOWHQPLQLPLHUWZHUGHQ'DQNGHUHUIROJUHLFKHQ
(UJHEQLVVHGHU6WX3D:DKODXVGHP-DKUVROOÄWKH7KLUG9RWH³DXFKLQGLHVHP-DKUEHLGHU6WX3D:DKO
XPJHVHW]WZHUGHQ(VVROOXQWHUDQGHUHPGHU(LQIOXVVGHV6WX3D20DWDXIGLH:DKOHQWVFKHLGXQJGHU:lKOHUJHPHVVHQ
ZHUGHQ'LH7HLOQDKPHDQGLHVHP([SHULPHQWLVWYROONRPPHQIUHLZLOOLJDQRQ\PXQGIOLHW1,&+7LQGDVGLHVMlKULJH
:DKOHUJHEQLVHLQ(UJHEQLVVHXQVHUH$QDO\VHZHUGHQXQWHUZZZVWXGLHQZDKOHFRQNLWHGXYHU|IIHQWOLFKW%HLZHLWHUHQ
)UDJHQVWHKHQHXFKZlKUHQGGHU:DKO$QVSUHFKSDUWQHUDQGHQ8UQHQ]X9HUIJXQJ9LHOHQ'DQNIUHXUH8QWHUVWW]XQJ
3DUWHLOLVWH
 :HOFKH/LVWHKDVWGXDXIGHLQHPHLJHQWOLFKHQ:DKO]HWWHOJHZlKOW" )L3V /LQNH6'6 -X6R/+* 'LH/LVWH 5&'6
6WX3$20DW
 +DVWGXGHQ6WX3$20DWYHUZHQGHWXPGLFKEHLGHLQHU(QWVFKHLGXQJ]XEHHLQIOXVVHQ" -DLFKKDEHLKQJHQXW]WGDEHLKDWHUPLFKEHLPHLQHU:DKOEHHLQIOXVVW
-DLFKKDEHLKQJHQXW]WGDEHLKDWHUPLFKEHLPHLQHU:DKOZHQLJEHHLQIOXVVW
-DLFKKDEHLKQJHQXW]WDOOHUGLQJVKDWHUPLFKLQPHLQHU:DKOQLFKWEHHLQIOXVVW
1HLQLFKKDEHLKQQLFKWJHQXW]W
8QLSROLWLN
 'LH9HUNHKUVYHUELQGXQJ]ZLVFKHQ&DPSXV6GXQG&DPSXV1RUGVROOYHUEHVVHUWZHUGHQ SRVLWLY QHJDWLY QHXWUDO
 'DV.,7VROOHLQHIOlFKHQGHFNHQGH)UDXHQTXRWHIU0LWDUEHLWHULQQHQHLQIKUHQ SRVLWLY QHJDWLY QHXWUDO
 (VVROO6WXGLHQJHEKUHQJHEHQ SRVLWLY QHJDWLY QHXWUDO
 ,QGHQ0HQVHQ	&DIHWHULHQVROOGDV$QJHERWDQYHJDQHQXQGQDFKKDOWLJHQ6SHLVHQDXVJHEDXWZHUGHQ
SRVLWLY QHJDWLY QHXWUDO
 'LH0D[LPDOVWXGLHQ]HLWVROODEJHVFKDIIWZHUGHQ SRVLWLY QHJDWLY QHXWUDO
 'HU0DVWHUSODW]IU.,7LQWHUQH%HZHUEHULQQHQVROOJDUDQWLHUWZHUGHQ SRVLWLY QHJDWLY QHXWUDO
 (VVROOIUDOOH.LQGHUYRQ.,7$QJHK|ULJHQDXFKYRQ6WXGLHUHQGHQHLQHQJDUDQWLHUWHQ.LWD3ODW]DXIGHP&DPSXVJHEHQ
SRVLWLY QHJDWLY QHXWUDO
 (LQGXUFKHLQHQYHUSIOLFKWHQGHQ6HPHVWHUEHLWUDJILQDQ]LHUWHV%DGHQ:UWWHPEHUJZHLWHV)HLHUDEHQGXQG:RFKHQHQGWLFNHWVROOHLQJHIKUWZHUGHQ
SRVLWLY QHJDWLY QHXWUDO
 (VVROOZHQLJHUNRPPHU]LHOOH:HUEXQJDXIGHP&DPSXVJHEHQ SRVLWLY QHJDWLY QHXWUDO
 'LHYHUIDVVWH6WXGLHUHQGHQVFKDIWVROOVLFKGDIUHLQVHW]HQGDVV)DFKWDJXQJHQNRQJUHVVHNHLQH+|UVDDONDSD]LWlWHQYHUZHQGHQ
SRVLWLY QHJDWLY QHXWUDO
 (LQ7HLOGHV6WXGLHUHQGHQEHLWUDJVDNWXHOO(85VROO]XU)LQDQ]LHUXQJHLQHV+DXVHVGHU6WXGLHUHQGHQVFKDIWYHUZHQGHWZHUGHQ'LHVHVZUGH5lXPHIU2UJDQHGHUYHUIDVVWHQ6WXGLHUHQGHQVFKDIW*UHPLHQ+RFKVFKXOJUXSSHQHWFELHWHQ
SRVLWLY QHJDWLY QHXWUDO
ELWWHZHQGHQĺ
	
 	  	
        !"#$%&'   %& ("  $() * #'#  %&$$ )
!"  '%&   +  ,$ *)"#   $ ##' - ' .")/$$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Figure 1: The 2018 experimental electoral ballot in German (scanner-ready A4-double-sided)
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)833/9 6HLWH
(YD6\V ([SHULPHQW7KH7KLUG9RWH
8QLSROLWLN>)RUWVHW]XQJ@
 6WXGHQWLVFKH*HOGHUVROOHQIUGLH|NRORJLVFKH*HVWDOWXQJGHV&DPSXVYHUZHQGHWZHUGHQ SRVLWLY QHJDWLY QHXWUDO
 'HU&DPSXVVROOHLQYHUNHKUVEHUXKLJWHU%HUHLFKZHUGHQ'LHVZUGHXQWHUDQGHUHP6FKULWWJHVFKZLQGLJNHLWIUGHQJHVDPWHQ)DKU]HXJYHUNHKU$XWRV0RWRUUlGHU)DKUUlGHUXVZEHGHXWHQ
SRVLWLY QHJDWLY QHXWUDO
 'LH3UHLVHLQGHU&DIHWHULDXQGGHU0HQVDVROOHQJHVHQNWZHUGHQ SRVLWLY QHJDWLY QHXWUDO
 (VVROOHQPHKU)DKUUDGVWHOOSOlW]HDQ+|UVlOHQXQGYRUGHU%LEOLRWKHNJHVFKDIIHQZHUGHQ SRVLWLY QHJDWLY QHXWUDO
 'DV.,7VROOIUHLQH9HUDQVWDOWXQJVKDOOHYJO*DUWHQKDOOHIUVWXGHQWLVFKH.XOWXUYHUDQVWDOWXQJHQVRUJHQ
SRVLWLY QHJDWLY QHXWUDO
 *HZlKOWH3HUVRQHQGHUYHUIDVVWHQ6WXGLHUHQGHQVFKDIWVROOHQHLQHILQDQ]LHOOH$XIZDQGVHQWVFKlGLJXQJHUKDOWHQN|QQHQ
SRVLWLY QHJDWLY QHXWUDO
 'LHYHUIDVVWH6WXGLHUHQGHQVFKDIWVROOHLQ1RWODJHQVWLSHQGLXPIU6WXGLHUHQGHGLHNXU]IULVWLJXQGQLFKWVHOEVWYHUVFKXOGHWLQHLQH1RWODJHJHODQJWVLQGHLQIKUHQ
SRVLWLY QHJDWLY QHXWUDO
 'HU$6W$VROOVLFKDNWLYGDIUHLQVHW]HQGDVVGLH'LJLWDOLVLHUXQJGHU/HKUHYRUDQJHWULHEHQZLUG=XP%HLVSLHO9RUOHVXQJVDXI]HLFKQXQJHQ:HELQDUH2QOLQHSODWWIRUPHQHWF
SRVLWLY QHJDWLY QHXWUDO
 'LH6WXGLHQJlQJHDP.,7VROOHQDXIHLQHQVFKQHOOHQ%HUXIVHLQVWLHJDXVJHOHJWVHLQ SRVLWLY QHJDWLY QHXWUDO
 'LH$XIZDQGVHQWVFKlGLJXQJIU$6W$5HIHUHQWLQQHQVROOJHNU]WZHUGHQZHQQHLQ5HIHUHQWVHLQHQ$XIJDEHQQLFKWQDFKNRPPW
SRVLWLY QHJDWLY QHXWUDO
 'LHYHUIDVVWH6WXGLHUHQGHQVFKDIWVROOWHVLFKPHKUJHJHQ([WUHPLVPXVMHJOLFKHU&RXOHXUHQJDJLHUHQ SRVLWLY QHJDWLY QHXWUDO
 'HU6WXGLHUHQGHQEHLWUDJDNWXHOO(85VROOJHVHQNWZHUGHQ SRVLWLY QHJDWLY QHXWUDO
 .ODXVXUHQDP.,7VROOHQDQRQ\PLVLHUWJHVFKULHEHQZHUGHQ SRVLWLY QHJDWLY QHXWUDO
 'LH6WXGLHUHQGHQVFKDIWVROOLP.,76HQDWVWlUNHUYHUWUHWHQVHLQ SRVLWLY QHJDWLY QHXWUDO
 'LHYHUIDVVWH6WXGLHUHQGHQVFKDIWVROOVLFKIUPHKU:RKQKHLPSOlW]HHLQVHW]HQ SRVLWLY QHJDWLY QHXWUDO
 'DV.,7±DXFKGHU&DPSXV6G±VROOHLQH=LYLONODXVHOKDEHQ SRVLWLY QHJDWLY QHXWUDO
 'LHYHUIDVVWH6WXGLHUHQGHQVFKDIWVROOVLFKZHLWHUKLQ]XDOOHQSROLWLVFKHQ7KHPHQlXHUQGUIHQ
SRVLWLY QHJDWLY QHXWUDO
 .ODXVXUHQVROOHQ]XU9HUEHVVHUXQJGHU+|UVDDOVLWXDWLRQKlXILJHUDXFKDP6DPVWDJVWDWWILQGHQ
SRVLWLY QHJDWLY QHXWUDO
 'LHPD[LPDOH$Q]DKODQ3UIXQJVYHUVXFKHQDP.,7VROOHUK|KWZHUGHQ SRVLWLY QHJDWLY QHXWUDO
9LHOHQ'DQNIU,KUH0LWDUEHLW

 	  
Figure 1: (continued) The 2018 experimental electoral ballot in German (scanner-ready A4-
double-sided)
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)833/9 6HLWH
(YD6\V ([SHULPHQW7KH7KLUG9RWH
%LWWHVRPDUNLHUHQ 3OHDVHXVHDEDOOSHQRUDWKLQIHOWWLSSHQ7KLVIRUPZLOOEHSURFHVVHGDXWRPDWLFDOO\
.RUUHNWXU 3OHDVHIROORZWKHH[DPSOHVKRZQKHUHWRFKDQJH\RXUDQVZHUV
³7KHWKLUGYRWH´LVDQH[SHULPHQWLQZKLFKZHZDQWWRWHVWWKHLGHDRI3URI$QGUDQLN7DQJLDQDLPHGDWPDNLQJUHSUHVHQWDWLYHGHPRFUDF\PRUHUHSUHVHQWDWLYH:LWKWKLVDOWHUQDWLYHHOHFWLRQPHWKRGWKHHOHFWRUDWH¶VSROLF\SURILOHLVPHDVXUHGXVLQJDQDGGLWLRQDOHOHFWLYHYRWH7KHSROLF\SURILOHRIWKHHOHFWRUDWHLVFRPSDUHGZLWKWKDWRIWKHFDQGLGDWHSDUWLHVDQGWKHGHJUHHWRZKLFKWKH\PDWFKGHWHUPLQHVWKHHOHFWLRQUHVXOW,QWKLVZD\ZHHQGHDYRUWRRYHUFRPHLUUDWLRQDOEHKDYLRUDQGYRWLQJSDUWLDOLW\3DUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKHVXUYH\LVFRPSOHWHO\YROXQWDU\DQRQ\PRXVDQGKDV12LQIOXHQFHRQWKHRIILFLDOHOHFWLRQ5HVXOWVRIRXUDQDO\VLVZLOOEHPDGHDYDLODEOHRQZZZVWXGLHUHQGHQZDKOHFRQNLWHGXIRUIXUWKHUTXHVWLRQVSOHDVHGRQRWKHVLWDWHWRDVNWKHHOHFWLRQFRRUGLQDWRUVDWWKHEDOORWER[HV
3DUW\
 :KLFKSDUW\GLG\RXFKRRVHRQWKHPDLQEDOORW" )L3V /LQNH6'6 -X6R
/+* 'LH/LVWH 5&'6
6WX3$20DW
 'LG\RXXVHWKH6WX3$20DW" <HVKHLQIOXHQFHGPH <HVKHLQIOXHQFHGPHDOLWWOH <HVEXWKHGLGQRWLQIOXHQFHPH
1R,GLGQRWXVHLW
&DPSXV3ROLWLFV
 3XEOLFWUDQVSRUWDWLRQEHWZHHQFDPSXVVRXWKDQGFDPSXVQRUWKVKRXOGEHLPSURYHG SRVLWLYH QHJDWLYH QHXWUDO
 7KH.,7VKRXOGHVWDEOLVKDFRPSUHKHQVLYHZRPHQVTXRWDIRUVWDIIPHPEHUV SRVLWLYH QHJDWLYH QHXWUDO
 7KHUHVKRXOGEHVWXG\IHHV SRVLWLYH QHJDWLYH QHXWUDO
 7KHFDQWHHQDQGFDIHWHULDVKRXOGH[WHQGWKHLURIIHUVRIYHJDQDQGVXVWDLQDEOHPHDOV SRVLWLYH QHJDWLYH QHXWUDO
 7KHPD[LPXPSHULRGRIVWXG\VKRXOGEHDEROLVKHG SRVLWLYH QHJDWLYH QHXWUDO
 7KHUHVKRXOGEHDPDVWHUSURJUDPJXDUDQWHHIRU.,7LQWHUQDSSOLFDQWV SRVLWLYH QHJDWLYH QHXWUDO
 7KHUHVKRXOGEHDJXDUDQWHHGFKLOGFDUHSODFHIRUHYHU\.,7PHPEHUVWXGHQWVLQFOXGHGRQWKHFDPSXV
SRVLWLYH QHJDWLYH QHXWUDO
 $%DGHQ:UWWHPEHUJZLGHHYHQLQJDQGZHHNHQGWLFNHWILQDQFHGE\DQREOLJDWRU\VHPHVWHUIHHVKRXOGEHHVWDEOLVKHG
SRVLWLYH QHJDWLYH QHXWUDO
 7KHUHVKRXOGEHDVPDOOHUDPRXQWRIFRPPHUFLDOSURPRWLRQVRQWKHFDPSXV SRVLWLYH QHJDWLYH QHXWUDO
 7KHVWXGHQWSDUOLDPHQWVKRXOGFRQVWLWXWHWKDWV\PSRVLDDQGFRQIHUHQFHVGRQRWXVHOHFWXUHKDOOFDSDFLWLHV
SRVLWLYH QHJDWLYH QHXWUDO
 $SDUWRIWKHVWXGHQWIHHFXUUHQWO\¼VKRXOGEHXVHGIRUILQDQFLQJDKRXVHRIWKHVWXGHQWERG\7KHVHURRPVZRXOGEHXVHGIRULQVWLWXWLRQVRIWKHVWXGHQWSDUOLDPHQWFRPPLWWHHVVWXGHQWJURXSVHWF
SRVLWLYH QHJDWLYH QHXWUDO
 6WXGHQWIXQGVVKRXOGEHXVHGIRUWKHHFRORJLFDOVKDSLQJRIWKHFDPSXV SRVLWLYH QHJDWLYH QHXWUDO
 7KHFDPSXVVKRXOGEHFRPHDWUDIILFFDOPHGVHFWRU7KLVZRXOGPHDQWRLQWURGXFHZDONLQJVSHHGIRUWKHHQWLUHYHKLFOHWUDIILFFDUVPRWRUF\FOHVELNHVHWF
SRVLWLYH QHJDWLYH QHXWUDO
 3ULFHVLQWKH&DIHWHULDDQGWKH0HQVDVKRXOGEHFXW SRVLWLYH QHJDWLYH QHXWUDO
SOHDVHWXUQSDJHĺ
	
	 
  

   	    ! "   # $%" " &# $ ' ! "()  (*
+  	 $' # ," #' #  (#- *  '
Continued next page: : :
Figure 2: The 2018 experimental electoral ballot in English (scanner-ready A4-double-sided)
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SRVLWLYH QHJDWLYH QHXWUDO
 7KHFRQVWLWXWHGVWXGHQWERG\VKRXOGLQWURGXFHDQHPHUJHQF\VFKRODUVKLSIRUVWXGHQWVZKRUHDFKHGVKRUWWHUPDQGQRWVHOILQIOLFWHGDQSOLJKWVLWXDWLRQ
SRVLWLYH QHJDWLYH QHXWUDO
 7KH$6W$VKRXOGDFWLYHO\SURPRWHWKHGLJLWDOLVDWLRQRIWHDFKLQJ)RUH[DPSOHOHFWXUHQRWHVZHELQDUVRQOLQHSODWIRUPVHWF
SRVLWLYH QHJDWLYH QHXWUDO
 7KHFRXUVHVDW.,7VKRXOGEHGHVLJQHGIRUDTXLFNFDUHHUHQWU\ SRVLWLYH QHJDWLYH QHXWUDO
 7KHH[SHQVHDOORZDQFHIRU$6W$UHIHUHQWVVKRXOGEHUHGXFHGLIDUHIHUHQWGRHVQRWIXOILOOKLVWDVNV SRVLWLYH QHJDWLYH QHXWUDO
 7KHZULWWHQVWXGHQWERG\VKRXOGEHPRUHLQYROYHGDJDLQVWH[WUHPLVPRIDQ\NLQG SRVLWLYH QHJDWLYH QHXWUDO
 7KHVWXGHQWFRQWULEXWLRQFXUUHQWO\¼VKRXOGEHORZHUHG SRVLWLYH QHJDWLYH QHXWUDO
 ([DPVDWWKH.,7VKRXOGEHZULWWHQDQRQ\PRXVO\ SRVLWLYH QHJDWLYH QHXWUDO
 7KHVWXGHQWERG\VKRXOGEHPRUHVWURQJO\UHSUHVHQWHGLQWKH.,76HQDWH SRVLWLYH QHJDWLYH QHXWUDO
 7KHVWXGHQWSDUOLDPHQWVKRXOGVWDQGXSIRUPRUHGRUPURRPV SRVLWLYH QHJDWLYH QHXWUDO
 7KH.,7FDPSXVVRXWKLQFOXGHGVKRXOGKDYHDFLYLOFODXVH SRVLWLYH QHJDWLYH QHXWUDO
 7KHVWXGHQWSDUOLDPHQWVKRXOGIXUWKHURQEHDOORZHGWRH[SUHVVLWVHOIWRHYHU\SROLWLFDOWRSLF SRVLWLYH QHJDWLYH QHXWUDO
 7RLPSURYHWKHOHFWXUHKDOOVLWXDWLRQH[DPVVKRXOGPRUHRIWHQWDNHSODFHDOVRRQ6DWXUGD\V SRVLWLYH QHJDWLYH QHXWUDO
 7KHPD[LPXPQXPEHURIH[DPLQDWLRQDWWHPSWVDWWKH.,7VKRXOGEHLQFUHDVHG SRVLWLYH QHJDWLYH QHXWUDO
7KDQN\RXIRU\RXUSDUWLFLSDWLRQ
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Figure 2: (continued) The 2018 experimental electoral ballot in English (scanner-ready A4-
double-sided)
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Table 3: The 2018 KIT student party positions on 30 questions (+[1]|Yes,  [1]|No, ?|
Neutral of missing) and the balance of public opinion thereon in three sets of experimental
votes
Questions of the experimental electoral ballot
(their StuPa-O-Mat numbers in parentheses)
F
iP
S
J
u
so
L
in
ke
L
H
G
L
IS
T
E
R
C
D
S
All
experi-
mental
votes
Experi-
mental
votes not
inuenced
by the
StuPa-O-
Mat
Experi-
mental
votes
inuenced
by the
StuPa-O-
Mat
Pros Cons Pros Cons Pros Cons
% % % % % %
1(3) Improve intra-campus transportation.... + + + ? ? + 28 4 27 4 31 4
2(6) Female quota. The KIT should establish... ? + +       15 54 15 52 14 57
3(1) Study fees. There should be study fees. ?     ?     10 74 9 77 11 69
4(24)Vegan meals. The canteen & cafeteria... ? + + ?     44 23 43 24 45 20
5(19)No study duration limit. The maximum...   ? +   +   38 38 36 36 40 40
6(17)Guaranteed master places. There should... +   + + + + 68 14 68 12 68 16
7(7) Guaranteed childcare places. There... + + + +   + 67 6 68 6 65 6
8(2) O-peak ticket. There should be a...   ? ?   +   48 30 55 26 37 38
9(8) Restrict commercial advertisement.... + ? +     + 27 22 28 21 27 23
10 Lecture halls for courses only. The... + ? ? ?     20 23 19 23 20 22
11(12) Financing the student body house from... + + +   + + 47 14 47 13 46 16
12(13) Student funds for the campus ecology....   ? +   ?   47 25 49 23 43 28
13(4) The campus should become a...     +       39 42 43 39 33 45
14(25) Lower mensa prices. Prices in the... + ? ? +   + 36 26 36 25 37 26
15 Larger bike parkings. More parking... + + + ? + + 71 6 70 7 73 4
16(9) Hall for cultural events. The KIT... + ? + ?     48 14 49 12 46 16
17(14) Expense allowances for the student...   ? ?     + 23 40 24 39 23 42
18(15) Emergency scholarships. The... + + + + +   69 8 68 8 71 7
19(16)Digitalization of teaching. The AStA... + ? + + + + 80 4 79 5 82 4
20(18) Career aiming courses. The courses at... ? ?   ?   + 35 31 40 25 26 42
21 Performance-dependent expense... + ? ? + + + 63 5 63 5 63 5
22 Engagement against extremism. The... + + ? + + + 57 10 56 9 57 10
23(11) Lower student fee. The student...     ? + ? + 13 41 13 39 12 44
24(22)Anonymous exams. Exams at the KIT... + + + + +   39 23 34 26 46 18
25 Student body representation in the... + + +   ? + 61 2 61 3 59 1
26(23)More dormitory rooms. The student... + + + ?   + 68 4 67 5 70 3
27(5) Civil clause. The KIT - campus south...   + +       29 21 25 18 35 26
28(10) Student body political involvement.... + + + ? +   80 5 78 5 82 5
29(21) Exams on Saturdays. To improve the... +     +   + 28 44 25 47 32 39
30(20)More examination attempts. The...   + +   +   41 35 43 33 37 39
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Balance of opinionsRCDSLISTELHGLinkeJusoFiPS
-100% -50% 0 50% 100%      
Percentage of NO/YES votes
(abstensions have been omitted)
15 Larger bike parkings. More...
14 Lower mensa prices. Prices...
13 The campus should become a...
12 Student funds for the campus...
11 Financing the student body...
10 Lecture halls for courses...
9 Restrict commercial...
8 Off-peak ticket. There should...
7 Guaranteed childcare places....
6 Guaranteed master places....
5 No study duration limit. The...
4 Vegan meals. The canteen &...
3 Study fees. There should be...
2 Female quota. The KIT should...
1 Improve intra-campus...
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Vote SPoM
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Figure 3: Balance of public opinion on 30 questions (grey|factual, box|normalized) and rep-
resentation thereof by the 2018 KIT Student parliament as if elected by party name using three
sets of experimental votes: All votes, Vote6=SPoM and VoteSPoM|that inuenced and not inu-
enced by the StuPa-O-Mat, respectively. The party bar length equals to the party's percentage
of votes. The party bar is missing if the party opinion on the question is neutral or unknown.
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(abstensions have been omitted)
30 More examination attempts....
29 Exams on Saturdays. To...
28 Student body political...
27 Civil clause. The KIT -...
26 More dormitory rooms. The...
25 Student body representation...
24 Anonymous exams. Exams at...
23 Lower student fee. The...
22 Engagement against...
21 Performance-dependent...
20 Career aiming courses. The...
19 Digitalization of teaching....
18 Emergency scholarships. The...
17 Expense allowances for the...
16 Hall for cultural events....
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Figure 3: (continued) Balance of public opinion on 30 questions (grey|factual, box|
normalized) and representation thereof by the 2018 KIT Student parliament as if elected by
party name using three sets of experimental votes: All votes, Vote6=SPoM and VoteSPoM|that
inuenced and not inuenced by the StuPa-O-Mat, respectively. The party bar length equals to
the party's percentage of votes. The party bar is missing if the party opinion on the question is
neutral or unknown.
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represents the actual and `passive' protagonists, having the normalized representativeness
r
FiPS,1
=
0:28
0:28 + 0:04
 0:88 (= 88%) :
We skip Questions 2{4 with no FiPS's opinion, and come to Question 5, `No study duration
limit'. In this case FiPS represents 37.7% of antagonists against 37.5% of protagonists (in Table 3
both percentages are rounded to 38). Taking into account the `passive' voters, we nd the FiPS'
normalized representativeness for Question 5:
r
FiPS,5
=
0:377
0:375 + 0:377
 0:51 (= 51%) ;
and so on. The FiPS' popularity index is its representativeness averaged over the questions with
the FiPS' denitive positions (there are 26 such questions, and four answers are missing):8
PFiPS =
0:88 + 0:51 +   
26
 0:70 (= 70%) :
The FiPS universality index is the percentage of questions on which it represents a majority
of the voters. Again, we restrict consideration to the 26 questions with the FiPS' denitive
positions. Since the FiPS represents a majority on 20 out of the 26 questions, we obtain
UFiPS = 20=26  0:77 (= 77%) :
These FiPS' popularity and universality indices are shown at the top-left of Table 4. The
popularity and universality indices of the student parties for three sets of votes (with dierent
protagonist-to-antagonist ratios) are computed in the same way. They are displayed in the rst
two columns of Table 4 visualized in Figure 4.
StuPa by the Second Vote (by Party Name) Assuming that the StuPa's position on each
question is determined by the StuPa majority, we dene the StuPa's policy prole as follows.
Column `2nd vote (by party name)' of Table 4 contains the percentages of votes for the student
parties within three experimental vote sets (the statistics are taken from Table 1). For instance,
four parties are positive regarding Question 1, and two are neutral, implying that the StuPa
has a positive position. (The StuPa's position on Question 1 is well seen in Figure 3, where all
color bars associated with Question 1 are on the right hand from the central axis.) Regarding
Question 2, Juso and Linke with their 23 + 20 = 43% of the 2nd votes (= 43% of StuPa seats)
are positive, LHG, LISTE and RCDS with 13 + 9+ 7 = 29% of the 2nd votes are negative, and
FiPS is neutral | so the StuPa is positive regarding Question 2, and so on.
After the StuPa's policy prole has been dened, the StuPa's popularity and universality
indices are computed like for a party. The StuPa indices for each vote set, diering in the
balances of public opinion, are shown in Rows `StuPa by 2nd vote' of Table 3 and are visualized
by the last block in the middle row of Figure 4.
StuPa by the Third Vote According to the Third Vote method, the parliament seats are
distributed among the eligible parties9 in proportion to the indices of representativeness. In our
study, we use the mean of the parties' popularity and universality (but it can be agreed in some
other way). The mean of parties' popularity and universality indices are shown in Column `Abs'
8Questions are equally weighted because our previous studies show a low sensitivity of popularity and
universality indices to (reasonably constrained) weighting of questions in case they are numerous.
9There can be eligibility lters. For instance, to owe Bundestag seats, a German party must get
three direct mandates (local representatives elected within 299 constituencies by the rst vote) or receive
nationwide at least 5% of the second votes. The StuPa has no such a lter.
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Table 4: The 30-question-based 2018 indices of the KIT student parties and Student Parliament
as if elected using ve methods applied to three sets of experimental votes
P U 2nd vote
(by party
name)
3rd vote
P+U
2
3rd vote+
P+U
2   12
2nd vote &
3rd vote
2nd vote &
3rd vote+
Abs Norm Abs Norm Norm Norm
% % % % % % % % %
All experimental votes
FiPS 70 77 27 73 18 23 21 23 24
Juso 72 89 23 81 20 31 28 21 25
Linke 72 83 20 77 19 27 25 20 22
LHG 57 57 13 57 14 7 6 14 10
LISTE 61 65 9 63 15 13 12 12 11
RCDS 58 60 7 59 14 9 8 11 8
Absolute Maximum 74 100
StuPa by
2nd vote 69 80
3rd vote 71 87
3rd vote+ 70 80
2nd vote/3rd vote 69 83
2nd vote/3rd vote+ 69 80
Experimental votes not inuenced by the StuPa-O-Mat
FiPS 69 73 31 71 18 21 21 24 26
Juso 71 84 24 78 19 28 28 22 26
Linke 72 87 16 80 20 30 29 18 22
LHG 56 52 12 54 13 4 4 13 8
LISTE 60 62 8 61 15 11 11 12 10
RCDS 58 57 9 58 14 8 7 12 8
Absolute Maximum 75 100
StuPa by
2nd vote 67 70
3rd vote 71 83
3rd vote+ 69 77
2nd vote/3rd vote 68 77
2nd vote/3rd vote+ 68 77
Experimental votes inuenced by the StuPa-O-Mat
FiPS 72 85 21 78 18 28 23 20 22
Juso 73 84 20 78 19 28 23 19 22
Linke 72 87 28 80 19 30 24 23 26
LHG 59 67 15 63 15 13 10 15 13
LISTE 61 65 11 63 15 13 11 13 11
RCDS 59 63 5 61 14 11 9 10 7
Absolute Maximum 74 100
StuPa by
2nd vote 70 83
3rd vote 73 90
3rd vote+ 70 83
2nd vote/3rd vote 71 87
2nd vote/3rd vote+ 70 83
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Figure 4: The 30-question-based 2018 indices of the KIT student parties and StuPa as if elected
using ve methods applied to three sets of experimental votes: all, the not inuenced and the
inuenced by the StuPa-O-Mat denoted by a, 6= and , respectively (visualization of Table 4)
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(= Absolute value) of Section `3rd vote P+U2 ' of Table 4. To distribute StuPa seats, the parties'
mean indices are normalized | proportionally reduced to the total of 100% | as shown in the
next Column `Norm'.
The modied StuPa apportionment changes the faction balance, aecting the StuPa's policy
prole and representativeness indices. The latter are given in Rows `StuPa by 3rd vote' of Table
4 and visualized by the bottom-left block in Figure 4. Compared with the StuPa determined
by the 2nd vote, a signicant gain in representativeness is attained, approaching its absolute
maximum (the values of popularity and universality if majorities are represented for all questions
are given in Rows `Absolute Maximum').
StuPa by the Third Vote Plus For the set of all experimental votes, the maximal faction
ratio in the StuPa elected by the 2nd vote (see the corresponding column of Table 4) is
2nd vote StuPa's maximal faction ratio = FiPS : RCDS = 27 : 7  4 :
The maximal faction ratio in the StuPa elected by the 3rd vote is equal to
3rd vote StuPa's maximal faction ratio = Juso : LHG = 20 : 14  1:4 :
If desired, this so-called equalization eect of the Third Vote can be tackled. Since the indices
of representativeness below 50% mean that minorities are represented rather than majorities,
we consider only the `positive representativeness', i.e. the positive segment of the party indices
above the threshold of 50% (if this segment is empty, the new index is nullied). The positive
representativeness of the parties | the index segments above 50% | are shown in Column `Abs'
of Section `3rd vote+ P+U2   12 ' of Table 4. To distribute the StuPa seats, these party indices
are normalized, as shown in the next column. This election method is called `Third Vote Plus'
or simply `3rd vote+'. Now the maximal faction ratio (for all experimental votes)
3rd vote+ StuPa's maximal faction ratio = Juso : LHG = 28 : 6  4:7 ;
somewhat surpassing the faction ratio under the 2nd vote.
The popularity and universality of the StuPa apportioned in accordance with this election
method is shown in Rows `StuPa by 3rd vote+' of Table 4 and the second block of the bottom
row of Figure 4. Compared with the 3rd vote, the 3rd vote+ results in a certain decrease in
the StuPa's representativeness. In our previous studies we have however observed an increase
in the StuPa's indices. This is explained by the fact that the eect of 3rd vote+ depends on the
contrast between party positions. If some parties are representative and others are not, the 3rd
vote+ strongly reduces or even eliminates the impact of non-representative parties and increases
the impact of representative ones, thereby increasing the parliament representativeness. This is
not our case, because all the six student parties are more representative than non-representative
and the range of their indices is not large. Moreover, the party proles are not really opposite:
their pairwise correlations are either positive or statistically insignicantly negative | for all
negative correlations P-values > 0:23. Hence, the 3rd vote+ only increases the disproportion of
the party factions, reducing the adequate coverage of public opinion by the parliament.
StuPa by a Combination of 2nd and 3rd votes The inuence of committee members is
usually dened by some index. For example, a co-owner of a rm has as many votes as the
number of his/her shares. Here, the number of shares is an index, percentage of shares is the
index normalized, and the share holders' inuence is determined by this normalized index. In
the German Bundestag, the number of seats owed by a party (= the number of parliament votes)
is proportional to the index `percentage of electoral votes received by the party'.
To combine two methods of allocation of parliament seats, we combine two corresponding
indices by taking their unweighted mean. To combine the vote by party name with the Third
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Vote, we take the mean of Columns `2nd vote' and `3rd vote/Norm' of Table 4 (both indices are
normalized to make them commensurable). The combined index (= size of the resulting StuPa
factions) is shown in Column `2nd vote & 3rd vote', and the popularity and universality indices
of the StuPa allocated in proportion to the combined index are given in Rows `StuPa by 2nd
vote/3rd vote'. Now the maximal faction ratio (for all experimental votes) is
2nd vote & 3rd vote StuPa's maximal faction ratio = FiPS : RCDS = 23 : 11  2:1 :
The combination of the 2nd vote and the 3rd vote+ is analogous. The corresponding StuPa
allocation index is in Column `2nd vote & 3rd vote+' of Table 4 which is the mean of Columns
`2nd vote' and `3rd vote+/Norm'. The popularity and universality of the StuPa allocated in
proportion to this index are shown in Rows `StuPa by 2nd vote/3rd vote+'. As one can see, the
maximal faction ratio (for all experimental votes) is equal to
2nd vote & 3rd vote+ StuPa's maximal faction ratio = Juso : RCDS = 25 : 8  3:1 :
As expected, the popularity and universality indices of the StuPa apportioned this way are
intermediate between the StuPas allocated using the corresponding single indices. This is also
well seen in Figure 4.
4 Evaluation of Coalitions
Although coalition building is not practiced in the StuPa, we nevertheless analyze this option
because of its general interest.
In real politics, parliament factions unite in coalitions, and only those with >50% of the
parliament seats are eligible to govern. The eligible coalitions are usually minimal, i.e. they
contain no more parties than necessary, because the more parties, the more complex the negoti-
ations and the less power enjoyed by each faction; cf. with Riker's minimum winning coalitions
[Riker 1962]. For instance, coalition FiPS+Juso+Linke+LHG is eligible but not minimal; that
is, coalition FiPS+Juso+Linke, being itself eligible, does not need LHG.
Another important condition is the parties' political compatibility, which we measure with
the index of unanimity | the percentage of questions on which all the coalition factions agree
or at least some agree and others are neutral. A high degree of unanimity facilitates coalition
building, because parties with close positions cooperate more easily. If the unanimity is below
50% the coalition is more incompatible than compatible. Therefore, we consider only minimal
eligible coalitions with the unanimity >50%.
If a coalition is unanimous on a certain question then its position on it is the same as of
every member. If coalition members disagree on an issue, then the probabilities of the coalition's
Yes/No answer to this question could be assumed proportional to the protagonist-to-antagonist
ratio within the coalition. As expressed in a personal conversation by Tobias Lindner, Bun-
destag member (GRUNE), the reality is even more uncertain. To characterize this additional
uncertainty, we introduce the faction size factor, 0  f  1; which we explain using an example.
Example of a Non-Unanimous Coalition's Position on a Policy Issue Let for a certain
question the protagonist-to-antagonist ratio within a coalition be 3:1, that is, the Yes-faction is
three times larger than the No-faction. The f = 0 denotes no role of faction sizes, when the
coalition adopts both answers `Yes' and `No' with equal chances 1=2. The f = 1 means the
decisive role of the faction sizes, when the coalition decision is adopted with the probabilities
proportional to the sizes of Yes-faction and No-faction. Since the weights of Yes- and No-factions
are equal to 3=(3+1) = 3=4 and 1=4, respectively, `Yes' is adopted with probability 3/4 and `No'
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with probability 1/4. The f = 1=2 means that the role of faction sizes is intermediate, being a
mix of the two extreme cases in proportion f = 1=2 and 1  f = 1=2:
Prob(Yes) = f|{z}
1=2
 3=4|{z}
Size inuence
of Yes-faction
+(1  f)| {z }
1=2
 1=2|{z}
No inuence
of size
= 5=8
Prob(No) = f|{z}
1=2
 1=4|{z}
Size inuence
of No-faction
+(1  f)| {z }
1=2
 1=2|{z}
No inuence
of size
= 3=8 :
In the rest of the paper, all computations are made for the medium uncertainty f = 1=2.
Coalition Indices of Representativeness Under uncertainty, the coalition indices of pop-
ularity and universality turn into random variables. Then the coalition's popularity and univer-
sality are understood as the expected size of the group represented, and as the expected frequency
in representing a majority, respectively. These indices are no longer exact magnitudes but esti-
mates, with their standard deviation regarded as the estimation accuracy. To compute coalition
indices, we use formulas from [Tangian 2014, p. 338].
Tables 5{7 illustrated by 3D Figures 5{7, respectively, show coalitions in the 2018 StuPa
as if elected using three vote sets (all the participants of the experiment, those who are not
inuences by the StuPa-O-Mat and those who are). Each table and the related gure show
StuPa's ve most unanimous minimal eligible coalitions | as most realistic | for ve election
methods: by the 2nd vote, 3rd vote(+) and combinations of the 2nd and 3rd(+) votes. For
all the indices, larger values mean `better' and are ranked higher, whereas greater standard
deviations are ranked lower, because they mean a lower index accuracy.
In the gures, each coalition is labeled with the abbreviation of the election method, as in
the corresponding table, and depicted by concatenated color bars whose lengths are proportional
to the faction sizes. The red agsta distinguishes the coalition of the StuPa elected by the 2nd
vote, i.e. by party name. The green agsta denotes the coalition of the StuPa elected by the
3rd vote, and the blue one | by the 3rd vote+. The mixed election methods are highlighted by
dashed agstas with the colors of the methods involved. The coalition's unanimity is shown
by the height of the agsta, and its XY coordinates are the coalition indices of popularity and
universality.
According to Table 4, the highest StuPa representativeness is attained under the 3rd vote,
whereas the most representative coalitions emerge under the 3rd vote+; see Tables 5 and 6. This
is explained by the fact that the 3rd vote+ boosts the size of two most representative parties,
Juso and Linke, makeing them sucient for an eligible coalition. Since they have very close
party proles (Unanimity = 92%) their coalition inherits their high representativeness which is
greater than that of the StuPa.
Table 7 and Figure 7 are computed for the set of votes inuenced by the StuPa-O-Mat. Here,
the 3rd vote methods show no superiority over the 2nd vote because the electors advised by the
StuPa-O-Mat vote for the parties that best represent their preferences. Hence, the popularity
and universality indices of all coalitions in Table 7, unlike that in previous two tables, are
practically equal, diering at most by 0.1%. Therefore, the `strange' location of the coalitions
in Figure 7 should not be misinterpreted, because all the `ags' are in fact densely clustered.
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Table 5: Indices of the most unanimous minimal eligible coalitions of the 2018 StuPa as if elected
by ve methods with all experimental votes assuming the faction size factor f = 0:5
Election method
Coalition
StuPa seats Unanimity Popularity Universality
Expec-
tation
Standard
deviation
Expec-
tation
Standard
deviation
%/Rank %/Rank %/Rank %/Rank %/Rank %/Rank
2|2nd vote
FiPS+Juso+Linke 27+23+20=70/2 76.67/2 68.56/5 1.30/1 82.13/2 4.37/5
3|3rd vote
FiPS+Juso+Linke 18+20+19=56/4 76.67/2 68.63/2 1.31/3 81.89/5 4.36/2
3+|3rd vote+
Juso+Linke 28+25=52/5 92.00/1 71.53/1 1.34/5 84.00/1 2.83/1
23|2nd vote/3rd vote
FiPS+Juso+Linke 23+21+20=63/3 76.67/2 68.59/4 1.31/2 82.02/3 4.37/4
23+|2nd vote/3rd vote+
FiPS+Juso+Linke 24+25+22=72/1 76.67/2 68.60/3 1.31/4 81.96/4 4.37/3
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Figure 5: Visualization of Table 5. Election method by agsta: red 2 | 2nd vote, green 3 |
3rd vote, blue 3+ | 3rd vote+, red/green 23 | mix of 2nd and 3rd votes, red/blue 23+ | mix
of 2nd vote and 3rd vote+.
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Table 6: Indices of the most unanimous minimal eligible coalitions of the 2018 StuPa as if elected
by ve methods with the experimental votes not inuenced by the StuPa-O-Mat assuming the
faction size factor f = 0:5
Election method
Coalition
StuPa seats Unanimity Popularity Universality
Expec-
tation
Standard
deviation
Expec-
tation
Standard
deviation
%/Rank %/Rank %/Rank %/Rank %/Rank %/Rank
2|2nd vote
FiPS+Juso 31+24=55/4 86.21/2 67.76/3 1.37/1 72.64/4 3.44/2
3|3rd vote
FiPS+Juso+Linke 18+19+20=57/2 76.67/3 67.83/2 1.44/4 79.04/3 4.36/4
3+|3rd vote+
Juso+Linke 28+29=57/3 92.00/1 71.34/1 1.40/3 87.94/1 2.83/1
23|2nd vote/3rd vote
FiPS+Juso+Linke 24+22+18=64/1 76.67/3 67.69/5 1.44/5 79.51/2 4.37/5
23+|2nd vote/3rd vote+
FiPS+Juso 26+26=52/5 86.21/2 67.75/4 1.37/2 72.42/5 3.45/3
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Figure 6: Visualization of Table 6. Election method by agsta: red 2 | 2nd vote, green 3 |
3rd vote, blue 3+ | 3rd vote+, red/green 23 | mix of 2nd and 3rd votes, red/blue 23+ | mix
of 2nd vote and 3rd vote+.
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Table 7: Indices of the most unanimous minimal eligible coalitions of the 2018 StuPa as if elected
by ve methods with the experimental votes inuenced by the StuPa-O-Mat assuming the faction
size factor f = 0:5
Election method
Coalition
StuPa seats Unanimity Popularity Universality
Expec-
tation
Standard
deviation
Expec-
tation
Standard
deviation
%/Rank %/Rank %/Rank %/Rank %/Rank %/Rank
2|2nd vote
FiPS+Juso+Linke 21+20+28=69/3 76.67/1 70.00/1 1.15/1 89.06/5 4.02/1
3|3rd vote
FiPS+Juso+Linke 18+19+19=56/5 76.67/1 69.94/5 1.16/5 89.16/1 4.03/5
3+|3rd vote+
FiPS+Juso+Linke 23+23+24=70/1 76.67/1 69.95/4 1.16/4 89.15/2 4.03/4
23|2nd vote/3rd vote
FiPS+Juso+Linke 20+19+23=62/4 76.67/1 69.98/2 1.16/2 89.10/4 4.03/3
23+|2nd vote/3rd vote+
FiPS+Juso+Linke 22+22+26=69/2 76.67/1 69.98/3 1.16/3 89.10/3 4.03/2
3
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Figure 7: Visualization of Table 7. Election method by agsta: red 2 | 2nd vote, green 3 |
3rd vote, blue 3+ | 3rd vote+, red/green 23 | mix of 2nd and 3rd votes, red/blue 23+ | mix
of 2nd vote and 3rd vote+.
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5 StuPa's Political Spectrum
The location of parties in the political space is the central question of most theories of po-
litical competition. Since [Smithies 1941, Downs 1957] (for recent comments on the latter see
[Van Houweling and Sniderman 2005]), this question has been extensively elaborated, both the-
oretically and methodologically. Although the objectivity of political space is sometimes called
into question [Benoit and Laver 2012, Otjes and Louwerse 2014], a number of particular direc-
tions have been developed.
For instance, [Hinich and Munger 1994, Poole 2005, Poole and Rosenthal 2007] and more
recently [Carroll et al. 2013] created a theory of ideological space which was applied to `dimen-
sionalize' the U.S. Congress ideological space, having overcome the paradox of low-dimensionality
using one-dimensional scaling with the least squares metric. The spatial theory of elections by
[Enelow and Hinich 1984, Enelow 1994, Enelow and Hinich 1990, Hinich and Munger 1997] was
developed mathematically by [Saari 1994, Saari 1995, Kriesi et al. 2006, Kriesi 2008] and later
by [Armstrong et al. 2014, Wheatley 2012, Wheatley et al. 2014, Wheatley 2015].
In our case, we construct the StuPa political spectrum by contiguously ordering student
parties, i.e. so that the neighboring parties would have close policy proles.
Correlation as a Proximity Measure for Party Proles Computing indices of popularity
and universality in Sections 3 and 4, we disregard neutral/missing party opinions, reducing party
policy proles to the questions with denitive answers. For contiguously ordering student parties,
these neutral/missing opinions are coded by 0s. The reasons are as follows. In this context, the
proximity of two proles A;B is measured by their correlation AB. If the proles are reduced to
questions with denitive answers then the `identity' of proles (correlation = 1) is intransitive.
For example, let three parties have the following proles for three questions:
Question LISTE LHG RCDS
A B C
2 (6) Female quota  1  1  1
6(17) Guaranteed master places 1 1 1
20(18) Career aiming courses  1 ? 1
If pairwise correlations between columns are computed omitting the row with the missing value
then
AB = BC = 1 but AC = 0:5 =) A  B  C but A 6 C :
If we replace the missing value by 0 then the implications are consistent:
AB = BC = 0:87 and AC = 0:5 =) A 6 B 6 C and A 6 C :
Correlation, even transformed into 1     0, is not a distance in the mathematical sense,
therefore we name it `proximity measure'. Correlation is however a standard reference for
contiguously ordering statistical variables [Friendly 2002, Friendly and Kwan 2003].
Another inconvenience of correlation is its indeniteness if one variable is constant (or both),
for instance, when one party answers `No' to all questions:
Question LISTE LHG
A B
2 (6) Female quota  1  1
5(19) No study duration limit 1  1
8 (2) O-peak ticket 1  1
) AB =1 (due to division by 0).
This situation is quite typical while reducing the number of questions because certain proles
after removing several questions become constant and cannot be processed.
To overcome such situations, we duplicate the questions in the negative form, inverting the
answers as shown below (this can be done by computer):
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Question LISTE LHG
A B
2 (6) Female quota  1  1
5(19) No study duration limit 1  1
8 (2) O-peak ticket 1  1 ) AB = 0:33 .
2 (6) in negative form: No female quota 1 1
5(19) in negative form: Study duration limit  1 1
8 (2) in negative form: No o-peak ticket  1 1
For the duplicated questionnaire the correlation is always dened (except for the case when one
party is neutral on all questions; then the duplication can be done with adding a constant to
the codes of opinions). It can be shown that such a duplication of questions does not change
the indices of representativeness.
Political Spectrum by Dimensionality Reduction A political spectrum is a map of po-
litical space where the parties are located. To construct it, the multidimensional location of
the parties is reduced to one or two most signicant dimensions using the principal component
analysis (PCA) [Tangian 2015, Tangian 2019]. Contiguously ordering statistical variables by
means of PCA described by [Friendly 2002, Friendly and Kwan 2003] can be easily adapted to
contiguously ordering policy proles.
Being based on linear transformations, PCA approximates a `cloud of observations', given
as vectors in a multi-dimensional space, by an ellipsoid whose rst diameter is directed along
the observations' maximal variance, the second diameter is directed along the second maximal
variance, etc. These orthogonal diameters are new coordinate axes, and the rst ones `explain'
most of the variance, so that other dimensions can be omitted without much loss of information.
These new orthogonal axes are linear combinations of the initial axes and are interpreted either as
composite factors or just as a geometric characteristic of the set of observations. Each principal
component is the set of projections of the initial vectors on the corresponding diameter, so we
can speak of the observations' variance along each diameter. For an introduction to PCA see
[Husson et al. 2011, Hyun et al. 2009, Jackson 1988, Krzanowski 1988, Seber 1984].
First of all, we explain PCA using an example of making a 2D map of a country which in
actuality is on the 3D globe. Let n reference points, e.g. cities, be given as 3D vectors in the
three-dimensional space. If the country is small, the least signicant dimension associated with
the earth's curvature is omitted and only North-South and East-West directions (explained by
two principal components) are retained. However, the task is not that straightforward. For
instance, in the case of Chile, which is a North-South strip 4250 km long and on average only
180 km wide, the rst component is associated with the North-South direction, the second with
the earth's curvature, and the least signicant third component with the East-West direction.
Then the Chile map based on the rst and second components would look like an arc | the
side view of Chile on the globe | instead of the usual bird's-eye view. In fact, to make a map,
we instead need to reect the air distances between the cities. Therefore, we associate every
city with a (n 1)-vector of its distances to other cities, including the 0-distance to itself, and
apply the dimensionality reduction to the (n  n)-matrix of intercity distances rather than to
the (3 n)-matrix of 3D city spatial coordinates.
Since a political spectrum is a kind of map, its construction using PCA is very similar. In
our model, we have parties instead of cities, and the party proles in Table 3 are analogous to
the set of the cities' 3D coordinates. Instead of matrix of intercity distances, we have the party
proximity matrix | the (6  6)-matrix of correlations between the parties' policy proles.10
10For pseudodistance between parties i; j; it is natural to use not correlation between the party proles
ij but inverse correlation 1   ij  0. Since PCA is based on linear transformations, the results for
correlation and inverse correlation are the same. So, we refer to correlation.
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This means that the jth party is identied with the vector of its proximity to other parties
(= correlations between their proles), including the proximity to itself, that is, with the jth
column of the correlation matrix:
~j = fij : i = 1; : : : ; 6g (vector of the jth party) :
Thus, party vectors are not party proles but vectors of proximities to other party proles. Since
these vectors have 6 elements each, they constitute a 5-dimensional conguration, and PCA nds
its 5 orthogonal diameters | eigenvectors of the covariance matrix of the correlation matrix
~ek; k = 1; : : : ; 5; (diameters of the `cloud' of vectors ~j)
and orders them by decreasing eigenvalues. Each party vector ~j receives in this new orthogonal
basis f~ekg coordinates fekjg :
~j $ fekj : k = 1; : : : ; 5g (new coordinates of vector ~j) .
The coordinates of vectors ~j on the rst diameter ~e1 is the rst principal component
fe1j : j = 1; : : : ; 6g (1st principal component with variance = 64.06%) .
The coordinates of vectors ~j on the second diameter ~e2 is the second principal component
fe2j : j = 1; : : : ; 6g (2nd principal component with variance = 21.53%) ,
and so forth. The projections of the parties' vectors ~j on the plane of the rst two eigenvectors
(diameters),
~j $ fe1j ; e2jg; j = 1; : : : ; 6 (rst two new coordinates of vectors ~j),
are shown in Figure 8. Together they explain 85.6% of the total variance, and the characteristics
of other principal components are displayed in Table 8, showing how rapidly the total variance
is exhausted by the rst principal components.
The angle between the jth party vector and the rst eigenvector (X-axis) is equal to
j =
8<: arctan

e2j
e1j

if e1j > 0
arctan

e2j
e1j

+  otherwise
;
and the closeness of two parties' policy proles is approximated by the angular closeness of the
party vectors. To be precise, the correlation between proles of two parties i; j is approximated
by the cosine of the angle between their vectors:
ij  cos ji   j j :
We obtain a circular ordering, in which adjacent parties have close policy proles. This circular
ordering can be unfolded to a linear one by splitting it at the largest gap | between the LISTE
and the LHG or between the LISTE and the Linke; see Figure 8. The resulting party ordering
Linke{Juso{FiPS{RCDS{LHG coincides with the intuitive left{right party arrangement. The
LISTE, a party of parodical character, stands apart but formally between the Linke and the
liberal-right LHG. Since PCA, nding a contiguous circular ordering, prescribes neither its split
point nor its direction | clockwise or counterclockwise | we shall always start from the LISTE
and follow the ideological left{right axis.
Figure 9 shows the correlation triangle for the unfolded ordering. It is a `relief table'
[Tangian 2011, p. 108] where the levels are distinguished by colors like the altitude on geo-
graphic maps: high values are shown in brown as mountains, the moderately positive in green
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Figure 8: Eigenvector plot for PCA analysis of party proles based on 30 questions with their
doubles in negative form
Table 8: PCA of the correlation matrix for party policy proles: explanation of variance and
cumulative sums
Principal component i Principal
component
variances
Vi
Cumulative sum
of principal com-
ponent variances
% %
1 64.06 64.06
2 21.53 85.60
3 8.79 94.39
4 3.19 97.58
5 2.42 100.00
Sum of squared principal component variances SPCA =
P5
i=1 V
2
i 4661.38
1 
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ST
E
1
.16
.18
.08
.00
.17
2 
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.62
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Figure 9: Correlation triangle for the 2018 KIT parties' vectors for 30 questions with their
doubles in negative form
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as plains, the moderately negative in pale blue as shallow waters, and strongly negative ones in
dark blue | as deep ocean. For a contiguous party ordering, the following rule would hold: the
closer to the diagonal, the higher the correlation (the higher the altitude).
Since our party ordering results from projecting 5D vectors (in the new coordinates) on
the 2D plane of the rst two principal components, the distances between the party vectors
in Figure 8 only approximate that in the 5D space (the plane projections explain not 100 but
85.6% of the total variance). Figure 9, on the contrary, shows the exact proximity (correlation)
of the party vectors, so there are some disproportions between correlation coecients along the
triangle diagonal and the angles in Figure 8. By the same reason, there are some irregularities
in the location of `higher altitudes' closer to the triangle diagonal. Regardless of these minor
inaccuracies, the general structure of the correlation triangle with the left{right party ordering
looks quite adequate and can be regarded as the StuPa's political spectrum.
6 Optimal Selection of Questions
In this section we analyze the process of reducing the initial set of questions. We assume that the
preselected 30 questions cover all important topics and nd subsets of most essential questions
which optimally highlight the dierences between the party positions.
A similar problem emerges in testing products, whereby evaluation criteria should highlight
the dierences in their quality. If the criteria poorly discriminate between the products | for
instance, if the power consumption of electric devices is equal, the noise is of the same level, and
the size of the units is the same, then a test based on these features is ill-designed. Likewise,
a survey questionnaire should also reveal dierences, because nearly-identical responses are of
little use.
Related Studies This task can be formulated in terms of reduction of the number of observa-
tions (items) or variables with little loss of information. In psychometrics, selection of records,
called `item analysis', is used to design reliable psychometrics tests, i.e. to select a few interview
questions sucient for measuring a certain subjective attitude [Guilford 1936, Kline 1986]. The
lower bounds for these tests are often estimated with the so-called Cronbach's  [Cronbach 1951].
In the machine learning and data mining literature, this problem is known as `feature selection'
or `variable subset selection' [Feature selection 2017]. In combinatorial mathematics, the goal is
formulated as reduction of matrices while preserving most of the column data, which is called
`the column subset selection'; for surveys see [Kumar and Schneider 2016, Zheng et al. 2010].
In the `principal component variable selection', one nds the principal components that are
linear combinations of the initial variables and then reduces the number of variables while pre-
serving the most important components. The rst results date back to 1970s; see [Jollie 1972,
McCabe 1975]. They were developed further by [McKay and Campbell 1982, McCabe 1984,
Krzanowski 1988, Jollie 2002, Al Kandari and Jollie 2005, Mori et al. 2007]. Among more re-
cent publications we can mention [Husson et al. 2011, Kuroda et al. 2011, Pacheco et al. 2013,
Armstrong et al. 2014, Mori et al. 2016]. The particular case of binary variables is considered
by [Broadbent et al. 2010, De Leeuw 2006].
The known methods are however of limited applicability for our purpose, because they have
other goals. The psychometrics tests are aimed at revealing an average subjective attitude to a
single object's quality by means of several more or less indirect questions; therefore, the ideal
reliable test must have not very high and not very low correlation between answers | we, on
the contrary, need minimal correlation. The methods of machine learning and feature selection,
being primarily designed for big data, use approximations which are not necessarily optimal.
Moreover, they attempt to maintain the initial distances between the observations, whereas our
goal is to accentuate the distinctions by increasing them. The `principal component variable
selection' deals with elimination of variables (= parties in our consideration) which cannot be
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disregarded. Above all, these methods cannot be easily explained to non-mathematicians, which
is critical in convincing the general public to apply them in the context of elections.
However, the `principal component variable selection' prompts the idea of preserving the
political spectrum (= the party ordering and the ratio of inter-party distances) while removing
questions.
Maximizing the Distance Between the Party Proles First of all we suggest a simple
direct procedure to select questions from a larger list. Let us consider the task performed by
the 2018 StuPa election committee: from 30 preselected questions in Table 3 choose 25 for the
StuPa-O-Mat. Our goal is to reduce the number of questions while accentuating the contrast
between the parties. To do this, we refer to the total Euclidean distance between the party policy
proles in Table 3 (after replacing  =?=+ with  1=0=+ 1, respectively, they constitute matrix
B). To make the total distances for question sets of dierent size commensurable, we normalize
the total Euclidean distance by dividing it by the square root of the number of questions in the
set:11
SDist = Total normalized Euclidean distance =
1pjQjXi<j
sX
q2Q
[B(q; i) B(q; j)]2 ; (1)
where
Q is a set of questions, e.g. Q = f1 : 30g denotes the set of 30 questions indexed from 1 to 30,
jQj is the number of questions in set Q,
q are indices of questions,
B is the (30  6) matrix of policy proles of six student parties with answers to 30 questions
coded by  1=0=+ 1,
B(q; i) is the qith element of matrix B (answer of Party i to Question q;)
: denotes the full or restricted range of matrix rows or columns; for instance, B(:; i), B(:; j) are
the ith and jth columns of matrix B, respectively, and B(Q; :) consists of the rows of B
associated with the set of questions Q.
To select 25 questions that maximize the total Euclidian distance between the columns of the
remainder of matrix B, we have to solve the maximization problemX
i<j
sX
q2Q
[B(q; i) B(q; j)]2 ! max
Q: Qf1:30g; jQj=25
: (2)
Table 9 shows the initial 30 questions and the 25 ones heuristically selected by the election
committee for the StuPa-O-Mat. The next column contains 24 `essential' questions obtained by
removing those with weakly unanimous party positions (when all positions are equal or neutral
| these questions poorly discriminate between the parties and are removed). The following
columns of Table 9 show selections of 20, 15 and 10 questions obtained by three optimization
models (another two models are considered below). The rst column in each group labeled `Dist'
results from maximizing the Euclidean distance between the party proles. The penultimate
row of the table provides the total normalized Euclidean distances for the selections of questions.
The growing total normalized Euclidean distance indicates at a growing contrast between the
parties as the size of optimal selection of questions decreases.
11This is a standard way of bringing multidimensional characteristics to the `common denominator'.
For instance, the distance between the vertices of an n-dimensional cube (0; : : : ; 0) and (1; : : : ; 1) is equal
to
p
n; dividing it by
p
n, the distance is reduced to 1 regardless of the cube's dimensionality.
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Table 9: Heuristic and optimal selections of questions
Preselected
30 questions
(StuPa-
O-Mat
numbers in
parentheses)
Number of questions retained
25 24 20 15 10
SPoM Model Dist PCAmPCAM Dist PCAmPCAM Dist PCAmPCAM
1(3) 
2(6)       
3(1) 
4(24)        
5(19)          
6(17)         
7(7)     
8(2)       
9(8)        
10      
11(12)         
12(13)        
13(4)         
14(25)        
15
16(9)         
17(14)       
18(15)      
19(16) 
20(18)       
21
22
23(11)       
24(22)       
25       
26(23)     
27(5)        
28(10)        
29(21)        
30(20)        
SDist 17:09 17:78 18:44 18:84 17:65 18:46 19:38 17:32 18:45 20:16 17:98 18:38
SPCA 4661 4817 4639 4645 3313 6090 5571 2824 7593 6211 2571 9078
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Conglobating the StuPa's Political Spectrum Maximization of the total distance be-
tween the party proles while reducing the list of questions can atten the political spectrum.
To preserve it from reshaping, we attempt to conglobate (= enhance the spherical form of) the
party vectors' conguration. For this purpose, the principal component variances in Table 8 are
equalized by minimizing the sum of their squares SPCA (at the bottom of the table). Thus, to
reduce the number of questions from 30 to k, we solve the optimization problem
SPCA =
5X
i=1
V2i ! min
Qf1:30g:jQj=k
(3)
subject to constraint
Vi are principal component variances for correlation matrix
12 
"
B(Q; :)
 B(Q; :)
#
:
Equalizing the variances by the least squares criterion is justied by the observation that ifPn
i=1 xi = 1 and x1; : : : ; xn  0 then min
Pn
i=1 x
2
i is attained for x1 =    = xn = 1=n :
Columns `PCAm' of Table 9 (PCA with minimization of squared principal component vari-
ances) show selections of 20, 15 and 10 questions satisfying this criterion. The last row of the
table provides the values of the objective function SPCA for these selections of questions. The
decreasing SPCA indicates at a growing conglobation of the conguration of party vectors.
Flattening the StuPa's Political Spectrum On the other hand, a attened spectrum is
better approximated by the 2D projections of party vectors on the plane of the rst two principal
components. Then the correspondence between the angles in Figure 8 and the coecients at the
correlation triangle's diagonal in Figure 9 is more accurate, whence the party ordering based on
Figure 8 is more contiguous.
Therefore, it makes sense to test the criterion of attening the party vectors' conguration
while removing questions. Thus, to reduce the number of questions from 30 to k, we solve the
optimization problem (3) with max substituted for min:
SPCA =
5X
i=1
V2i ! max
Qf1:30g:jQj=k
subject to constraint
Vi are principal component variances for correlation matrix 
"
B(Q; :)
 B(Q; :)
#
:
The use of the largest squares criterion is justied by the observation that if
Pn
i=1 xi = 1 and
x1  x2      xn  0 then maxPni=1 x2i is attained for x1 = 1; x2 =    = xn = 0 :
Columns `PCAM' of Table 9 (PCA with maximization of squared principal component vari-
ances) show selections of 20, 15 and 10 questions found for this criterion. The last row of the
table provides the values of the objective function SPCA for these selections of questions. The
increasing SPCA indicates at attening of the party vectors' conguration.
7 Evaluation of Optimal Selections of Questions
The party indices and, correspondingly, the Third Vote election outcomes depend on the ques-
tions included in the experimental ballot. The 12 sets of questions considered so far are selected
in accordance to some heuristic and normative criteria, and now we evaluate them regarding the
12Since we perform PCA for the matrix of correlations between policy proles, the matrix of policy
proles B (initial or for reduced number of questions) is concatenated with its negative copy  B | for
the negatively reformulated questionnaire; see p. 26.
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StuPa representativeness, the representativeness of its most plausible coalitions and preservation
of the political spectrum.
StuPa by the Third Vote with Shorter Questionnaires To estimate the StuPa's repre-
sentativeness, we repeat all computations described in Section 3, assuming that the Third Vote
ballot is based on one of 12 sets of questions in Table 9.
The popularity and universality indices of the StuPas as if elected using these versions of the
Third Vote are displayed in Table 10 and its detailed version, Table 13 (each horizontal section
of the former is detailed by a sheet of the latter). The rst vertical section of Table 10, computed
for the Third Vote ballot with 30 questions, contains the same StuPas' representativeness indices
(P/U) as Table 4. Additionally it shows the ranking (R) of their means and the maximal faction
ratio (FR) for the StuPa elected that way.
It should be emphasized that the indices are rounded to within one percent, so minor dier-
ences between the indices are neglected. The ranks are computed for the means of the rounded
indices not column-by column but throughout each horizontal section of the table associated
with a particular type of the StuPa-O-Mat inuence. This is done for comparability of election
outcomes for all the versions of the Third Vote ballots diering in the number of questions and
the models with which they are selected.
To be specic, we explain the upper-left block of the table which is computed for all ex-
perimental votes with 30 questions. The ranks of the mean indices are 6, 1, 5, 4, 6. Rank 3
is missing, but it appears in other blocks of the upper horizontal section of the table as well
as Ranks 7 and 8. The maximal StuPa faction ratios, depending on the election method, are
3.8, 1.4, 4.3, 2.1 and 3.2. These ratios are computed from Columns `2rd vote', `3rd vote/Norm',
`3rd vote+/Norm', `2rd vote & 3rd vote/Norm' and `2rd vote & 3rd vote+/Norm' in the up-
per section of Table 4. For instance, Faction Ratio 1.4 for the 3rd vote is the maximal ratio
20 : 14  1:4 of the percentages of normalized 3rd votes (= percentages of StuPa seats) in
Column `3rd vote/Norm' of Table 4. Table 13 displays this column completely, and one can see
that this maximal ratio is attained for factions of Juso and LHG or Juso and RCDS.
The second upper block of Table 10 is computed in the same way assuming that the ex-
perimental electoral ballot contains 25 StuPa-O-Mat questions instead of 30 (one can imagine
Table 4 recalculated). Since the party indices of popularity and universality computed for 25
questions are not the same as before, the StuPa elected by the Third Vote methods is appor-
tioned in a modied way. The indices of popularity and universality of the StuPa, unlike that
of the parties, are computed again for all 30 questions. This enables comparing the `complete'
representativeness of the StuPa elected using the Third Vote with dierent questionnaires.
The main objective of our analysis is to understand whether the parliament elected by
the Third Vote with a short questionnaire is as representative as elected by the Third Vote
with 30 questions. Therefore, we evaluate the questionnaires by the representativeness of the
resulting parliaments. Since each questionnaire is tested using ve election methods, the average
evaluation of a questionnaire is given by the total of ve ranks shown under each block of
Table 10. A smaller total rank indicates the questionnaire that, on the average, implies a more
representative StuPa. Since the 2nd vote (by party name) is independent of the questionnaire,
the indices and, consequently, the ranks in Rows `2' (characterizing the 2nd vote) of Table 10
are all the same. Since all total ranks of the table's horizontal section contain this constant
rank, they characterize the Third Vote questionnaires only.
Comparing ranks from the table's dierent horizontal sections makes little sense. For in-
stance, the StuPa's representativeness for the votes inuenced by the StuPa-O-Mat (the table's
bottom section) depends very little on the election method, because the votes are consistent
with the electors' preferences. The fewness of the StuPa index levels results in the fewness of
ranks, making the total ranks smaller than in other table's sections. The range of total ranks
14{17 is also the smallest. The largest range of total ranks of 13{31 is inherent in the middle
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Table 10: 30 question-based indices of representativeness of the 2018 KIT Student Parliament
as if elected by the Third Vote with dierent selections of questions and the maximal faction
size ratios FR
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section of the table which describes the case of votes not inuenced by the StuPa-O-Mat, i.e.
the case when the electors vote least consistently with their preferences. For this category of
electors, the Third Vote is most ecient, and the best criterion seems to be the PCAM | which
attens the policy spectrum.
StuPa Coalitions under the Third Vote with Shorter Questionnaires We consider
the most realistic | most unanimous minimal eligible | coalitions in the StuPa as if elected
using the experimental ballots with dierent selections of questions shown in Table 9. For each
selection, we perform the analysis described in Section 4 and summarize the results in Table 11
and its detailed version, Table 14 (each horizontal section of the former is detailed by a sheet of
the latter). Their design is analogous to that of Tables 10 and 13 but we nevertheless make a
few remarks.
The left vertical section of Table 11 shows the results obtained for the questionnaire of 30
questions, as in Section 4. It contains most important elements of Tables 5{7 | the rounded
indices of popularity and universality of the most unanimous minimal eligible coalition under
ve election methods and the ranks of their means (computed throughout the horizontal section
of the table). The coalition's composition, faction size and unanimity are additionally displayed
in Table 13.
As in Table 10, the questionnaires are evaluated by the total ranks, in this case of the
StuPa's most realistic coalitions under ve election methods. Again, smaller total ranks within
a horizontal section of the table indicate `better' questionnaires. As in the previous paragraph,
for the set of votes not inuenced by the StuPa-O-Mat (for which the Third Vote is most
relevant), the best criterion seems to be the PCAM which aims at policy spectrum attening.
StuPa's Political Spectrum for Shorter Questionnaires Figure 10 displays 12 PCA
eigenvector plots for the party proles based on 12 selections of questions from Table 9. The
corresponding correlation triangles for the contiguous party orderings are shown in Figure 11.
They are computed exactly in the same way as in Section 5, and the upper-left plots in Figures
10 and 11 repeat the plots of Figures 8 and 9, respectively.
To facilitate comparisons, all party orderings begin with the LISTE. Its vector stands apart
from other vectors in all the plots of Figure 10 except for the 11th set of questions; see the
central-bottom plot. As well seen from `higher altitudes' along the correlation triangle diagonals
in Figure 11, the party orderings are fairly contiguous. The party orderings are very similar,
the only deviations from the initial ordering (in the upper-left plot) are four permutations of
adjacent Juso and Linke and two permutations of adjacent RCDS and LHG.
To judge about the dierences between political spectra more formally, we compute the
correlations between them. We proceed in the following way. For each selection of questions
Qt; t = 1; : : : ; 12; we compute the (66)-matrix of correlations Ct between six duplicated party
policy proles based on questions Qt. The columns of matrix Ct are concatenated, resulting in
a (36 1)-vector ct whose elements are correlations (proximities) of party prole pairs:
Ct = 
"
B(Qt; :)
 B(Qt; :)
#
) ct ; t = 1; : : : ; 12 :
Vectors ct; t = 1; : : : ; 12; have the invariable order of party pairs, and comprehensively describe
12 congurations of party vectors in the 5D space | the political spectra based on dierent
questionnaires. We characterize the proximity between these spectra by the (12 12)-matrix of
their correlations (c1    c12) shown in Table 12.
The table's rst row is for us most interesting. It characterizes the distortions of the initial
spectrum (based on 30 questions) as the Third Vote questionnaire is becoming shorter. This is
a natural consequence of information losses, the correlations displayed in the table's rst row
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Table 11: 30-question-based indices of the most unanimous minimal eligible coalitions of the
2018 StuPa as if elected by Third Vote methods using dierent selections of questions, assuming
the faction size factor f = 0:5
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Figure 10: Eigenvector plots for PCA analysis of party proles based on dierent selections of
questions with their doubles in negative form
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Figure 11: Correlation triangles for the 2018 KIT parties' policy proles for 12 selections of
questions
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Table 12: Pearson correlations between the political spectra obtained for dierent selections of
questions
Number of questions in the Third Vote ballot and method of their selection
30
Preselected
25
SPoM
24
Essential
20
Dist PCAmPCAM
15
Dist PCAmPCAM
10
Dist PCAmPCAM
30 Preselected 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.94 0.97 0.97 0.91 0.92 0.95 0.89 0.86
25 SPoM 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.94 0.97 0.96 0.90 0.92 0.93 0.87 0.88
24 Essential 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.88 0.86
20 Dist 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.91 0.89 0.93 0.88 0.82
PCAm 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.95 1.00 0.88 0.87 0.98 0.76 0.81 0.91 0.72
PCAM 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.88 1.00 0.95 0.83 0.95 0.93 0.85 0.91
15 Dist 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.87 0.95 1.00 0.83 0.92 0.97 0.85 0.82
PCAm 0.91 0.90 0.92 0.91 0.98 0.83 0.83 1.00 0.71 0.76 0.95 0.68
PCAM 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.89 0.76 0.95 0.92 0.71 1.00 0.93 0.75 0.95
10 Dist 0.95 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.81 0.93 0.97 0.76 0.93 1.00 0.76 0.85
PCAm 0.89 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.91 0.85 0.85 0.95 0.75 0.76 1.00 0.67
PCAM 0.86 0.88 0.86 0.82 0.72 0.91 0.82 0.68 0.95 0.85 0.67 1.00
PVAL < 0:0005 for all elements of the table
are very high. Even the questionnaire reduction to 10 questions (loss of 2/3 of information) is
not critical: the correlation between the resulting political spectrum and the initial one is of the
range 0.86{0.95.
For questionnaires of the same size, e.g. with 20 questions, the political spectrum is best
preserved if the questionnaires are selected using the Dist criterion. In fact, with regard to
extremities attained under the conglobation PCAm and attening PCAM criteria, the Dist
criterion provides a medium conglobation/attening of the political spectrum; see the last row
in Table 9.
8 Conclusions
The 2018 experiment demonstrates that the Third Vote election methods, particularly the Third
Vote+, also combined with the traditional second vote, can signicantly improve policy repre-
sentation both of a parliament and of governing coalitions. To avoid manipulability of elections,
it is suggested that the questions could be drawn up by the parties themselves and shared with
all other parties, giving them an opportunity to make their positions comparable. This process,
if considered part of the electoral campaign, would exclude all claims of partiality. However, the
questions can be too numerous to be included in the electoral ballots and, at the same time, can
poorly highlight the parties' distinctions. By practical reasons, the questions should be rather
few in number and independent | not to overweight some topics | and maximally discriminate
between the parties. To reduce long questionnaires, three optimization models are proposed and
tested. It looks that the most appropriate is the combination of the 2nd and 3rd vote+ methods,
and the reduction of the questionnaire can be done using the Dist criterion.
It should be noted that mathematical advancements alone are insucient. They do not
replace the parties' creativity and fantasy in formulating challenging policy issues. As economics,
Western politics is based rather on supply than demand, and following this principle leaves much
to be desired. The student parties often focus on secondary problems and respond to them in the
same key. All of these result in a political landscape with limited diversity and weak opposition.
Correspondingly, the student electorate's turnout is low and voting outcomes are not always
rational. This means that there are matters beyond the election methodology that may need
serious consideration.
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9 Appendix: Detailed Tables 10 and 11
Table 13: Table 10 with faction size ratios FiPS : Juso : Linke : LHG : LISTE : RCDS and
their maxima
Election
method
30 preselected questions 25 SPoM questions 24 essential questions
P/U R Faction ratio max P/U R Faction ratio max P/U R Faction ratio max
All experimental votes
2 69/80 6 27:23:20:13:9:7 3.8 69/80 6 27:23:20:13:9:7 3.8 69/80 6 27:23:20:13:9:7 3.8
3 71/87 1 18:20:19:14:15:14 1.4 71/87 1 18:20:19:14:15:13 1.5 71/87 1 18:21:20:14:15:13 1.5
3+ 70/80 5 21:28:25:6:12:8 4.3 70/80 5 24:30:28:7:9:3 10 71/83 2 24:36:31:1:7:0 101
23 69/83 4 23:21:20:14:12:11 2.1 69/80 6 23:21:20:14:12:10 2.2 69/80 6 23:22:20:13:12:10 2.2
23+ 69/80 6 24:25:22:10:11:8 3.2 70/83 3 25:26:24:10:9:5 5.2 70/83 3 26:29:26:7:8:4 7.8
Total rank 22 21 18
Election
method
20 questions in the Third Vote ballot
Dist PCAm PCAM
P/U R Faction ratio max P/U R Faction ratio max P/U R Faction ratio max
All experimental votes
2 69/80 6 27:23:20:13:9:7 3.8 69/80 6 27:23:20:13:9:7 3.8 69/80 6 27:23:20:13:9:7 3.8
3 71/87 1 19:20:20:13:15:13 1.6 71/87 1 19:21:19:14:13:13 1.6 71/87 1 18:20:19:13:17:13 1.6
3+ 71/83 2 27:32:31:1:8:0 Inf 70/83 3 28:34:28:4:3:3 12 71/83 2 19:34:29:0:17:0 Inf
23 69/80 6 23:21:20:13:12:10 2.4 69/80 6 23:22:20:13:11:10 2.3 69/83 4 22:21:20:13:13:10 2.3
23+ 70/83 3 27:27:26:7:9:4 7.6 70/83 3 27:28:24:9:6:5 5.7 70/80 5 23:28:25:7:13:4 7.9
Total rank 18 19 18
Election
method
15 questions in the Third Vote ballot
Dist PCAm PCAM
P/U R Faction ratio max P/U R Faction ratio max P/U R Faction ratio max
All experimental votes
2 69/80 6 27:23:20:13:9:7 3.8 69/80 6 27:23:20:13:9:7 3.8 69/80 6 27:23:20:13:9:7 3.8
3 71/87 1 20:20:20:13:15:13 1.6 71/87 1 18:20:19:14:15:14 1.4 71/87 1 15:19:19:14:18:15 1.4
3+ 70/80 5 32:32:31:0:5:0 Inf 70/83 3 23:28:28:6:8:7 4.5 71/87 1 5:36:30:0:26:3 Inf
23 69/80 6 24:21:20:13:12:10 2.3 69/80 6 23:21:20:14:12:11 2.1 69/83 4 21:21:19:14:14:11 1.9
23+ 70/83 3 30:27:26:7:7:4 8.2 69/80 6 25:25:24:10:9:7 3.6 70/83 3 16:29:25:7:17:5 5.6
Total rank 21 22 15
Election
method
10 questions in the Third Vote ballot
Dist PCAm PCAM
P/U R Faction ratio max P/U R Faction ratio max P/U R Faction ratio max
All experimental votes
2 69/80 6 27:23:20:13:9:7 3.8 69/80 6 27:23:20:13:9:7 3.8 69/80 6 27:23:20:13:9:7 3.8
3 69/83 4 19:23:21:10:13:14 2.2 70/80 5 19:16:17:17:15:16 1.3 69/80 6 15:25:21:10:17:13 2.5
3+ 71/83 2 21:44:35:0:0:0 Inf 70/77 7 29:15:20:16:8:12 3.5 69/83 4 0:57:32:0:12:0 Inf
23 69/80 6 23:23:21:12:11:10 2.2 71/87 1 23:19:19:15:12:11 2.0 69/83 4 21:24:20:12:13:10 2.4
23+ 70/83 3 24:33:28:7:5:4 9.3 68/73 8 28:19:20:15:9:10 3.2 71/87 1 14:40:26:7:11:4 11
Total rank 21 27 21
Continued next page: : :
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Table 13: (continued) Table 10 with faction size ratios FiPS : Juso : Linke : LHG : LISTE :
RCDS and their maxima
Election
method
30 preselected questions 25 SPoM questions 24 essential questions
P/U R Faction ratio max P/U R Faction ratio max P/U R Faction ratio max
The experimental votes not inuenced by the StuPa-O-Mat
2 67/70 7 31:24:16:12:8:9 3.7 67/70 7 31:24:16:12:8:9 3.7 67/70 7 31:24:16:12:8:9 3.7
3 71/83 1 18:19:20:13:15:14 1.5 71/83 1 18:20:21:14:15:13 1.5 69/80 3 18:20:21:13:15:13 1.6
3+ 69/77 4 21:28:29:4:11:7 7.4 70/80 2 23:31:35:3:7:1 44 70/80 2 23:35:39:0:4:0 Inf
23 68/77 5 24:22:18:13:12:12 2.1 68/77 5 25:22:18:13:12:11 2.2 68/77 5 25:22:18:12:12:11 2.2
23+ 68/77 5 26:26:22:8:10:8 3.3 69/80 3 27:27:25:7:8:5 5.7 69/80 3 27:29:27:6:6:4 6.7
Total rank 22 18 20
Election
method
20 questions in the Third Vote ballot
Dist PCAm PCAM
P/U R Faction ratio max P/U R Faction ratio max P/U R Faction ratio max
The experimental votes not inuenced by the StuPa-O-Mat
2 67/70 7 31:24:16:12:8:9 3.7 67/70 7 31:24:16:12:8:9 3.7 67/70 7 31:24:16:12:8:9 3.7
3 69/80 3 19:20:22:13:15:12 1.8 69/80 3 19:20:21:13:13:13 1.6 71/83 1 17:20:21:12:17:12 1.7
3+ 70/80 2 26:31:39:0:4:0 Inf 70/80 2 28:34:37:0:0:0 Inf 70/80 2 16:32:38:0:14:0 Inf
23 68/77 5 25:22:19:12:11:11 2.4 68/77 5 25:22:18:12:11:11 2.3 68/77 5 24:22:18:12:13:11 2.3
23+ 69/80 3 28:28:27:6:6:4 6.5 69/80 3 30:29:26:6:4:5 7.0 69/77 4 24:28:27:6:11:4 6.4
Total rank 20 20 19
Election
method
15 questions in the Third Vote ballot
Dist PCAm PCAM
P/U R Faction ratio max P/U R Faction ratio max P/U R Faction ratio max
The experimental votes not inuenced by the StuPa-O-Mat
2 67/70 7 31:24:16:12:8:9 3.7 67/70 7 31:24:16:12:8:9 3.7 67/70 7 31:24:16:12:8:9 3.7
3 69/80 3 19:20:22:12:14:13 1.8 71/83 1 18:18:22:14:14:14 1.6 71/83 1 15:19:21:13:18:15 1.6
3+ 70/80 2 29:29:42:0:0:0 Inf 70/80 2 24:25:41:1:5:5 31 71/83 1 0:30:48:0:22:0 Inf
23 68/77 5 25:22:19:12:11:11 2.3 68/77 5 25:21:19:13:11:11 2.2 69/80 3 23:21:18:12:13:12 1.9
23+ 69/80 3 30:26:29:6:4:4 7.1 69/80 3 27:25:28:7:7:7 4.3 71/83 1 16:27:32:6:15:4 7.3
Total rank 20 18 13
Election
method
10 questions in the Third Vote ballot
Dist PCAm PCAM
P/U R Faction ratio max P/U R Faction ratio max P/U R Faction ratio max
The experimental votes not inuenced by the StuPa-O-Mat
2 67/70 7 31:24:16:12:8:9 3.7 67/70 7 31:24:16:12:8:9 3.7 67/70 7 31:24:16:12:8:9 3.7
3 69/80 3 19:23:21:10:13:14 2.3 69/77 4 20:14:21:16:14:16 1.5 69/77 4 14:26:21:10:17:13 2.7
3+ 70/80 2 20:44:36:0:0:0 Inf 67/70 7 33:0:41:12:3:10 Inf 69/80 3 0:57:31:0:12:0 Inf
23 68/77 5 25:23:19:11:11:11 2.3 69/73 6 25:19:18:14:11:12 2.2 69/80 3 23:25:18:11:13:11 2.3
23+ 69/80 3 26:34:26:6:4:4 8.1 67/70 7 32:12:28:12:6:10 5.6 69/77 4 16:40:23:6:10:4 9.2
Total rank 20 31 21
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Table 13: (continued) Table 10 with faction size ratios FiPS : Juso : Linke : LHG : LISTE :
RCDS and their maxima
Election
method
30 preselected questions 25 SPoM questions 24 essential questions
P/U R Faction ratio max P/U R Faction ratio max P/U R Faction ratio max
The experimental votes inuenced by the StuPa-O-Mat
2 70/83 4 21:20:28:15:11:5 5.9 70/83 4 21:20:28:15:11:5 5.9 70/83 4 21:20:28:15:11:5 5.9
3 73/90 1 18:19:19:15:15:14 1.3 73/90 1 19:18:19:15:14:13 1.4 73/90 1 19:19:20:15:14:13 1.5
3+ 70/83 4 23:23:24:10:11:9 2.7 70/83 4 26:24:26:12:8:4 5.8 71/87 3 27:27:29:8:6:3 11
23 71/87 3 20:19:23:15:13:10 2.4 71/87 3 20:19:23:15:13:9 2.6 71/87 3 20:20:24:15:13:9 2.6
23+ 70/83 4 22:22:26:13:11:7 3.8 70/83 4 23:22:27:14:9:5 5.9 71/87 3 24:24:28:12:9:4 7.7
Total rank 16 16 14
Election
method
20 questions in the Third Vote ballot
Dist PCAm PCAM
P/U R Faction ratio max P/U R Faction ratio max P/U R Faction ratio max
The experimental votes inuenced by the StuPa-O-Mat
2 70/83 4 21:20:28:15:11:5 5.9 70/83 4 21:20:28:15:11:5 5.9 70/83 4 21:20:28:15:11:5 5.9
3 73/90 1 20:19:20:14:15:13 1.5 73/90 1 19:20:20:14:14:13 1.6 73/90 1 19:19:19:15:16:13 1.5
3+ 71/87 3 30:27:29:6:8:0 61 71/87 3 26:29:29:8:5:2 14 71/87 3 25:25:28:7:15:0 Inf
23 71/87 3 20:20:24:15:13:9 2.7 71/87 3 20:20:24:15:12:9 2.8 71/87 3 20:19:23:15:14:9 2.7
23+ 71/87 3 26:24:28:11:9:3 11 71/87 3 24:25:28:12:8:3 8.4 71/87 3 23:23:28:11:13:2 12
Total rank 14 14 14
Election
method
15 questions in the Third Vote ballot
Dist PCAm PCAM
P/U R Faction ratio max P/U R Faction ratio max P/U R Faction ratio max
The experimental votes inuenced by the StuPa-O-Mat
2 70/83 4 21:20:28:15:11:5 5.9 70/83 4 21:20:28:15:11:5 5.9 70/83 4 21:20:28:15:11:5 5.9
3 73/90 1 21:18:19:14:14:14 1.5 73/90 1 19:19:20:15:14:14 1.5 73/90 1 17:17:18:16:17:15 1.2
3+ 71/87 3 36:25:29:3:4:3 14 71/87 3 24:25:28:10:8:6 4.9 71/87 3 19:17:27:13:17:8 3.3
23 71/87 3 21:19:23:15:13:9 2.5 71/87 3 20:20:24:15:13:9 2.6 71/87 3 19:18:23:16:14:10 2.3
23+ 71/87 3 29:22:28:9:8:4 7.1 71/87 3 22:23:28:13:9:5 5.4 71/87 3 20:18:27:14:14:6 4.3
Total rank 14 14 14
Election
method
10 questions in the Third Vote ballot
Dist PCAm PCAM
P/U R Faction ratio max P/U R Faction ratio max P/U R Faction ratio max
The experimental votes inuenced by the StuPa-O-Mat
2 70/83 4 21:20:28:15:11:5 5.9 70/83 4 21:20:28:15:11:5 5.9 70/83 4 21:20:28:15:11:5 5.9
3 71/87 3 20:20:20:12:13:15 1.7 72/90 2 19:16:18:16:16:15 1.3 73/90 1 17:20:21:13:16:13 1.6
3+ 71/87 3 35:31:34:0:0:0 Inf 70/83 4 25:14:23:15:12:10 2.5 72/90 2 17:35:38:0:10:0 Inf
23 71/87 3 21:20:24:14:12:10 2.4 71/87 3 20:18:23:16:13:10 2.3 71/87 3 19:20:24:14:13:9 2.7
23+ 71/87 3 28:26:31:8:5:2 13 70/83 4 23:17:25:15:12:7 3.4 72/90 2 19:28:33:8:10:2 14
Total rank 16 17 12
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Table 14: Detailed Table 11
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Table 14: (continued) Detailed Table 11
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Table 14: (continued) Detailed Table 11
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